Statute of Limitations and Preclusive Periods: How Is the Time Limit for Bringing an Action Determined?

The time limit for bringing an action is not found merely by adding a set number of years to the date of the event. First the type of right and claim to be asserted is determined, then the applicable period, the triggering event, the grounds for suspension or interruption, and the step to be taken. The statute of limitations, the preclusive period and the procedural time limits within proceedings produce different consequences. Applying the rule for one to another may lead to a loss of rights. [1, 2]

A debt that is time-barred does not, as a rule, disappear automatically; it gives the debtor a plea of limitation where its conditions are met. Where a preclusive period is concerned, the loss of the relevant right or of a particular procedural opportunity may be at stake. Missing a procedural time limit also often affects the ability to take a particular step in the case. For this reason, the answer to "Has my time run out?" must be sought together with the answers to "For which right, which step, and by which date should you have acted?" [1, 2, 9]

This guide has been prepared for private law disputes and civil actions in Türkiye. Time limits for applications in criminal, administrative and tax litigation are subject to their own special regimes. The explanations rest on the legislation reviewed as of 11 October 2026; the transitional rule on the 2026 partial-claim amendment and on pre-emption is also addressed. The examples are hypothetical and should be read with the assumptions stated.

What is the difference between the statute of limitations, the preclusive period and the procedural time limit?

Does the statute of limitations automatically extinguish the debt?

The statute of limitations distinguishes between the existence of the claim and the defence affecting its enforcement through the courts. Under Article 161 TBK, the judge may not take account of the limitation of its own motion unless it is raised. The debtor must raise the defence in the proper form. The creditor may rely on the difference in the start date and on grounds of interruption or suspension. Saying "the debt is old" is not an adequate file review unless it shows which period and which dates have been used to reach that conclusion. [1]

Article 78 TBK provides that enrichment arising from the performance of a time-barred debt cannot be reclaimed. This also shows that limitation does not make the debt non-existent. On the other hand, an action brought after the period has expired may face a valid plea of limitation, creating a risk that the claim is dismissed and that the costs of the proceedings are borne by the claimant. The fact that an action can be brought does not mean that it will succeed. [1, 2]

When should the plea of limitation be raised?

The defendant should, in principle, raise the plea of limitation expressly in its statement of defence within the time allowed, identifying which claim is time-barred and on which start date and period. Whether a plea may be raised later is assessed under the written or simplified procedure, the prohibition on extending the defence, the express consent of the other party and, where applicable, the provisions on amendment. The idea that "the judge will look at it anyway" is inconsistent with Article 161 TBK; equally, an unqualified statement that a plea "can never be raised later" disregards the procedural options. [1, 2]

The claimant may also find that proving the existence of the debt alone is not sufficient. When the plea is raised, counter-statements such as a later maturity, an acknowledgment of debt or the effect of mediation must be presented with their supporting grounds. The judge's inability to apply limitation of its own motion does not mean that a plea which has been raised will not be examined.

What does a preclusive period extinguish?

A preclusive period requires that the relevant right, or a specific opportunity for challenge conferred by statute, be exercised in time. It differs from limitation in that the court does not take account of it of its own motion in the same way. However, it cannot be said for every preclusive period that "the same right is extinguished and the action is always dismissed on procedural grounds". Which right, which procedural opportunity and which route of action are affected must be determined from the specific provision. [2, 9]

Professor Vildan Peksöz's study suggests an important distinction at this point: a period that ends the substantive right and a period that prevents the right from being made the subject of a particular action should not be treated as having the same character. This is a debate in legal doctrine on legal characterisation; it is not a general statutory provision that predetermines a single type of dismissal for all actions. In practice, the distinction matters for the reasoning of a decision and for the possibility of a new application. [9]

Why must time limits within proceedings be monitored separately?

The period for the answer to a claim, for submitting evidence, for objecting to an expert report or for an appeal is not the same as the limitation period of the underlying claim. Evidence may be lost while the claim is not yet time-barred. An appeal period may be missed after a timely action when the decision is served. For this reason the case calendar should not show only the last day for bringing the action. [2]

Table 1. Comparison of the three types of time limit

What information is needed first when determining the time limit for bringing an action?

The first task is to identify the legal claim rather than the everyday name of the dispute. A single event may give rise to a contractual claim, a claim for tort damages, unjust enrichment or a claim under a special statute. Not all of them are necessarily subject to the same start date and the same period. Whether the parties are merchants, consumers, employees or a public administration may also affect the applicable provision. [1, 4, 5]

The second task is to identify the correct party against whom the claim is to be made. A claim against a company and the liability of another person are not the same. The effect of an act against one person on another should not be assumed automatically. For example, Article 155 TBK specially regulates the effect of interruption as regards joint and several debtors and sureties; interruption against the principal debtor and interruption against the surety do not produce the same result reciprocally. [1]

The third task is to prepare a documented chronology. The date of the contract, the maturity, delivery, notice of termination, the loss and the date on which the liable party was learned of, payment, acknowledgment of debt, the mediation application and the final report should each be entered on separate lines. Remembering a date is not the same as documenting it. A notice of service, an electronic service record, a bank receipt or an application receipt should support the calculation.

How long is the general limitation period and when does it start?

The general ten-year period does not apply to all claims

Under Article 146 TBK, in the absence of a contrary provision, claims are subject to a ten-year limitation period. This provision cannot be read as meaning "all actions are brought within ten years". Under Article 147 TBK, certain claims are subject to a five-year period, and other provisions and special laws set different periods. The special regime is examined first; the general rule applies only within its own field. [1]

Among the examples subject to a five-year period are periodic performances such as rent, wages and interest on principal, and claims arising from agency and certain other contracts. The exception concerning the gross fault of the contractor in a contract for work is also in the same article. For this reason, one should not stop at the name of the contract; it must be determined on which breach and which performance the claim is based. [1]

The start may not be the day the contract was signed

Under Article 149 TBK, limitation in principle begins when the claim becomes due. Maturity means the point at which performance of the claim can be demanded. In a debt with a term, the date of the contract and the date of payment may differ. Where maturity depends on a notice, there is a special rule that the period starts from the day on which notice may be given. A creditor may not indefinitely postpone the period by delaying the formal notice. [1]

Hypothetical example: A contract is concluded on 10 January and payment is agreed for 10 April. When the start of limitation is determined, the signing date alone is not looked at; the type of claim, the term and maturity are assessed. If the other party relies on early maturity or on a claim that arose earlier, the contract and notices should be examined together.

For periodic claims, the due date of each period matters separately. Timely demand for the last month's rent or wages does not automatically preserve all earlier periods. The special provision in Article 150 TBK on lifetime income and similar periodic performances should also not be applied without distinction to all ordinary monthly claims. [1]

How is the period determined in tort and unjust enrichment?

In tort, the date of learning and the long period are assessed together

Under Article 72 TBK, a claim for damages becomes time-barred two years from the date the injured party learns of the damage and of the person liable to pay compensation, and in any event ten years from the date the wrongful act was committed. The special rule where the damages arise from an act punishable under criminal law for which a longer criminal limitation period applies is examined separately. The two-year and ten-year periods are not cumulated into a total twelve-year period. [1]

The date of learning is not the date of a report in every file. The nature of the damage, its development, the identifiability of the liable party and when which information was obtained are investigated. The other party may rely on correspondence or an application showing that the damage and the liable party were known earlier. The claimant may, for its part, give concrete detail to show that the extent of the damage was understood only later or that the start date is different. The statement "I was waiting for the report" cannot be accepted as a safe reason for waiting without examining the legal start date.

In unjust enrichment the start is different

Under Article 82 TBK, the two-year period is linked to the claimant's learning of the right to reclaim, and the ten-year period to the occurrence of the enrichment. The start wording of the tort rule should not be carried across to this claim. First it must be determined why the payment or transfer of assets is being reclaimed and whether a valid contractual relationship exists. [1]

It should not be thought that a claim can be given a different name so that expired periods are overcome in every case. The court makes the legal characterisation on the facts alleged; the conditions of the different grounds must actually be present. Special rules also exist as to whether certain time-barred claims may be used as a defence. The provisions in Articles 72 and 82 TBK on refusing performance should therefore be examined separately from the right to claim. [1, 2] Readers facing a similar situation may find our article on the liability of the company manager and the board of directors helpful.

To which start dates are the frequently encountered periods linked?

Table 2. Selected periods under private law

The table should be used together with the explanations below. It is assumed that the special conditions are present in every row. The expiry, suspension, interruption and calculation of the last day cannot be deduced from this table alone. [1, 3, 4] Details of this stage are also addressed in our article on annulment of a company general meeting decision.

Do not confuse labour claims with reinstatement periods

The maturity of a wage claim and the start of a claim for severance pay, notice pay or annual leave pay arising on termination are not the same. The continuation of employment does not automatically suspend limitation for all claims in wage claims. Article 153 TBK's provision on the employment relationship has a special scope for domestic workers; it should not be extended automatically to all employees. [1, 4]

Annex Article 3 and Provisional Article 8 of the Labour Law regulate the time-bar of annual leave pay and of the listed compensation claims following the 2017 amendment. Periods that began earlier must be separated from terminations falling under the new regulation. The calculation cannot be applied in the same way to all past files merely by reference to the five-year period read today. [4]

Reinstatement involves a much shorter succession of application stages. Mediation must be applied to within one month of service of the notice of termination; if agreement cannot be reached, an action may be brought within two weeks from the drawing up of the final report. The period for the mediator to conclude the file and the worker's periods for application and action differ. The notice of termination, the application document and the final report should be kept together. [4, 5]

Why is the old two-year information not sufficient for pre-emption?

Under the current text of Article 733 TMK, the statutory right of pre-emption must be exercised within three months from notification of the sale through a notary and, in any event, within one year from the sale. The amendment made by Law No. 7571 reduced the earlier two-year upper period to one year. However, Provisional Article 1 TMK preserves the earlier provisions for sales made before the amendment came into force. For this reason, a firm answer such as "the upper period is one year" or "it is two years" should not be given without knowing the date of the sale. [3]

Here the learning of the sale, the notarial notice provided for in the law and the sale itself are separate facts. The short three-month period and the upper period linked to the sale are monitored together. The exercise of the right by action against the buyer is the subject of Article 734 TMK; a mere statement that an objection was made to the other party is not treated as if an action had been brought. [3]

What is the difference between suspension and interruption of limitation?

Suspension does not erase the time that has passed

Where a ground for suspension exists, limitation does not begin to run or an already running period does not advance. When the obstacle is removed, the period begins in the form the law provides or continues from where it stopped. Article 153 TBK contains provisions, for example, on claims between spouses while the marriage continues and on claims of a child against its parents during the period of custody. Not every kinship or every meeting is the same as the situations listed in that article. [1]

Where a valid ground for suspension arises after a certain part of the period has already elapsed, the removal of the ground does not erase that part. The remaining period must be determined. Adding a day arbitrarily to the calendar without documenting the start and end of the suspension is not sufficient.

Interruption starts a new period

Article 154 TBK regulates grounds such as the debtor's acknowledgment of the debt, certain acts of performance and security, the creditor's application to the court or to an arbitrator through an action or a plea, enforcement proceedings and filing a claim in bankruptcy. Under Article 156 TBK, a new period begins after interruption. Where the debt is acknowledged by a document or is tied to a judgment or arbitral award, the provision that the new period is ten years is separately regulated. [1]

Not every correspondence is an acknowledgment of debt. "Let us talk" and a conditional offer aimed at settlement are different from the acceptance of a specific debt. The purpose of a partial payment, its explanation and the capacity of the payer are important. Ordinary interruption calculations cannot be made for a period that has already expired; the legal effect of any later explanation or payment must be assessed separately.

After an action or enforcement proceeding has been brought, the movements in the file are also significant. Article 157 TBK specifically regulates the resumption of limitation that has been interrupted in an action or enforcement. The fact that a file has appeared in the system for years does not mean that the period has been suspended indefinitely under all circumstances. [1]

Which steps do not automatically protect the period?

Table 3. Effect of common steps on the period

It should not be concluded that a formal notice is useless. A formal notice may be necessary for default, for demanding performance or for exercising specific rights. However, the fact that a step has another legal function does not mean that it necessarily interrupts limitation. A formal notice and an action or enforcement step may both be needed in the same file to meet different purposes. [1, 2]

For preclusive periods, too, the step prescribed by law must be identified. Merely giving notice of a right by formal notice may not be enough where the right must be exercised by action. The statement "a preclusive period never stops in any circumstances" is therefore incomplete, since express statutory exceptions such as mediation are assessed separately. [3, 6]

How does mediation affect limitation and the preclusive period?

In mediation as a condition precedent to suit, the application to the office is important

Under Article 18/A(15) of Law No. 6325, from the application to the mediation office until the drawing up of the final report, limitation is suspended and the preclusive period does not run. Article 3 of Law No. 7036 on Labour Courts should also be taken into account in labour disputes. This protection relates to the legal scope of the application; it cannot be assumed that all unrelated rights and all procedural time limits are automatically protected by a mediation application. [5, 6]

Making an application does not, as a rule, revive a period that has already ended. For this reason, the date of the application should be recorded together with how much time remained before the period expired. When the final report is drawn up, the period remaining under the general rule is distinguished from the action period separately provided by the special statute. The two-week period for reinstatement is not a general rule applicable to all mediation disputes. [4, 5, 6]

The start in voluntary mediation is not the same

In voluntary mediation before an action is brought, Article 16 of Law No. 6325 determines the start by reference to the invitation of the parties to the first meeting, understanding of the continuation of the process and the documentation of this in a record. The start after an action has been brought is separately provided in the same article. Calling a mediator by telephone or proposing a meeting to the other party does not by itself show that these conditions have been completed. [6]

The legal start of the mediation process should not be confused with ordinary settlement meetings, and the time between the statutory start and the end of the process should not be disregarded in calculating the period. If the period is approaching while the parties are meeting, it is necessary to know not only the meeting dates but also the statutory regime to which the process is subject.

How are days, weeks, months and years calculated?

Separate the calculation of procedural time limits from substantive-law periods

Articles 91–93 HMK regulate the start and method of calculation of procedural time limits. Where the period is set in days, the day of service or pronouncement is not counted. Where it is set in weeks, months or years, the corresponding day method under the law applies; the absence of a corresponding day in the last month is separately regulated. Public holidays are included in the period; the consequence where the last day falls on a public holiday is different. It is wrong to count all days as working days or to disregard all weekends. [2]

For limitation, Article 151 TBK provides that the start day is not counted and that the last day on which the right is not exercised is the end of the period; the calculation refers to the provisions on time limits for performance of obligations. The scope of Articles 92–93 TBK and the rules in the HMK should therefore be determined. For preclusive periods, the special provision and the nature of the period are examined separately. [1]

Hypothetical examples on the calendar

Example 1 — Two-week procedural period: Assume that service of notice was duly made on Monday 5 October 2026 and that the relevant rule gives two weeks from service. In the absence of any other factor, the corresponding day is Monday 19 October 2026. This calculation is only for the stated assumption; if a different start rule or a special provision applies, the result changes. [2]

Example 2 — One-month period: If in a step to which Article 92 HMK applies the start is 31 January 2026, then since there is no 31st day in the following month, the last day of that month is taken as the end; whether that last day is a holiday is assessed separately. The purpose here is to show that a month is not always thirty days. Whether the same approach applies to another period depends on the basis of that period. [2]

In these examples no judicial recess, special suspension order, irregular service or other provision relating to force majeure is assumed. Depending on the channel by which the step is taken, the time of day of the step within the last day may also matter; leaving an electronic application to the last minute is not a prudent method of monitoring.

Do electronic service and the judicial recess change the calculation?

In electronic service the arrival date and the date of service differ

Under Article 7(a) of the Notification Law No. 7201, electronic service is deemed to have been made at the end of the fifth day following the day on which it reached the addressee's electronic address. A notification message sent to an e-mail or telephone must not be confused with a legal service record. The rule under which the period for the particular step will start is then determined. [7]

Hypothetical example: If an electronic notice reaches the account on 5 October 2026, the fifth day that follows is 10 October 2026. Acceptance of service is formed at the end of that day. This five-day rule is not the same calculation as the period for a later response or for an appeal; the date of arrival, the date of deemed service and the last day for the step must be recorded separately. [7]

In the case of irregular service, the rule on learning in Article 32 may come into play. However, irregular service and the complete absence of service are not the same fact; the claim, the date of learning and the method of application must be assessed on the basis of the file. It is not safe to accept that no periods have started merely on the basis of a statement "I did not see it". [7]

The judicial recess does not suspend all time limits

The judicial recess system under Articles 102–104 HMK is assessed for the time limits laid down by the Law in cases and matters falling within its scope. Article 104 HMK provides for an extension of one week from the end of the judicial recess under certain conditions. That provision does not mean that all limitation and preclusive periods are suspended throughout the summer. Matters that continue to be heard during the judicial recess are also specified. [2]

In particular, for the time limit for bringing an action, one should not act on the thought that "the courts are on holiday, so I can wait". The substantive-law period of the principal claim, any requirement of mediation and the steps that may be taken during the judicial recess should be checked together.

How did the 2026 amendment affect partial actions and the increase of claims?

Article 107 HMK has been repealed; there is a transitional rule for earlier actions

Article 19 of Law No. 7589, published on 31 July 2026, repealed Article 107 HMK, which governed the action for an uncertain claim. Provisional Article 1(10) of the same Law provides that Article 107 continues to apply to actions brought before the date of repeal. Accordingly, an old article's suggestion to "bring an action for an uncertain claim" cannot be used as it stands for a new action brought today. Earlier actions are also not deemed to have become a new type of action on the same day merely because the provision was repealed. [2, 10]

Limitation for the part of a partial action that is increased

The fourth paragraph added to Article 109 HMK provides that, where part of a claim has been sued upon, the claim may be increased once within the same action, without being subject to the prohibition on extending the claim, until the end of the investigation. In that case, limitation is also deemed to be interrupted from the date of the action as regards the increased part. The new provision prevents the unqualified repetition of earlier assessments as regards the remaining part of the partial action. [2, 10]

The provision is nevertheless not a guarantee that removes every deficiency. The divisibility of the claim, the scope of the claim asserted, whether the increase is made within the same action and within the statutory stage, the one-time nature of the opportunity and the necessary court fee procedures must be assessed. Limitation that has already expired before the action was brought is not renewed by this provision. Nor should the addition of another head of claim and the increase in the amount of the existing claim be assumed to be the same step.

The effect of the new rule on completed and uncompleted steps in earlier partial actions must be examined with Article 448 HMK and the stage of the file. The fact that the transitional provision expressly protects earlier actions for an uncertain claim does not mean that it provides a single answer to every question in every earlier file. The start of interest, default and the scope of the claim are not the same matter as the interruption of limitation. [1, 2, 10]

What limit does the Çetin Akboğa decision recall?

In the decision of the General Assembly of the Constitutional Court in Çetin Akboğa, the rejection, on grounds of limitation, of the part of compensation arising from a workplace accident that was determined and increased during the proceedings was assessed. The Court considered together the applicant's inability to fix the amount at the outset, the late obtaining of the expert report and the nature of the second action, and held that in the concrete case there was a disproportionate interference with the right of access to a court. [11: §§62–75]

This decision cannot be read as meaning that limitation in all compensation claims necessarily begins with the expert report, or that all objections as to time limits will be ineffective. The procedural rules of the period in which the decision was given must be separated from the 2026 amendment. The basic warning that can be carried into current files is that the application of time limits must not become an automatic function that disregards the actual circumstances of the case and the right of access to a court.

If the time seems to have expired, what options should be examined?

First check the accuracy of the calculation and of the step

It should be re-evaluated whether the period has in fact expired, by reference to the correct legal basis, the start, suspension, interruption, service and transitional provisions. A calculation error, the omission of an actual ground for suspension, or the choice of the wrong type of claim may change the result. However, the belief that one is in the right does not in itself remove a statutory time limit.

Where it is argued that there has been unpredictability or disproportion in the courts' application of time limits, the claim must be put forward with concrete grounds in the ordinary remedies. An individual application cannot replace the ordinary steps that should have been taken. The documents in the file and the reasoning in the decision must be examined together with the scope of the remedy. [2, 11]

The sixty-day period in Article 158 TBK is not a general rescue period

Article 158 TBK provides an additional period, subject to conditions, where an action or a plea has been rejected on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, lack of competence, a correctable error or premature filing, and in the meantime the limitation or preclusive period has expired. Not every rejection on procedural grounds, every incomplete application or every late filing automatically gives a new sixty-day period. [1]

After a decision of lack of jurisdiction or lack of competence, there is a two-week period under Article 20 HMK for the transmission of the file, with its own possible starting points. Article 158 TBK and Article 20 HMK must not be used in place of each other. The finality of the decision, recourse to a legal remedy and the service records should be checked together. [1, 2]

Does restoration of the prior status revive every type of period?

Restoration of the prior status under Article 95 HMK et seq. depends on specific conditions where procedural steps have been missed for reasons beyond the party's control. The removal of the obstacle, the time of the application, the performance of the step that could not be taken and other statutory requirements are important. This institution is not a general route for restarting every limitation period or preclusive period under substantive law. Where a special provision exists, it is examined on its own conditions. [2]

What additional checks are needed in older files and in files with a foreign element?

Article 5 of Law No. 6101 contains transitional provisions for periods that began before the entry into force of the Turkish Code of Obligations. Similarly, there are special transitional rules for labour claims, pre-emption and types of action. It is necessary to read the current law, but it is also necessary to determine separately which regime applies to the past event. [3, 4, 8, 10]

Historical extraordinary provisions suspending periods are taken into account only where the event, person, region, transaction and date fall within their scope. A historical provision does not mean that periods are suspended today in all files. Where such an effect is alleged in a concrete file, the entry into force and scope of the relevant decision must be verified separately.

In a dispute with a foreign element, the bringing of an action before a Turkish court does not mean that every substantive-law period is necessarily subject to Turkish law. Article 8 MÖHUK links limitation to the law applicable to the legal transaction and relationship. The procedural time limit and the substantive limitation must be separated; the content of the applicable foreign law must also be investigated within the framework of Article 2 MÖHUK. [12]

Time-limit control table that can be used in the file

Table 4. Working record for the time-limit review

A calendar programme and reminders are useful; however, it is not correct to treat the software as having made the legal characterisation. If an incorrect start is entered, many reminders will repeat the same wrong date. The basis of the period, its calculation and the step taken should be kept in writing.

Where the client delivers a document late, understands service differently, or believes that the period has been suspended during negotiations, this must be addressed in the file. The risk should be explained clearly; an approaching period must not be left invisible while information or instructions are awaited. Verifying that the step has actually been completed, and reporting back to the client, are as much part of orderly file management as making the step itself.

Conclusion

Determining the time limit for bringing an action correctly first requires identifying correctly the right and the applicable law. The name of the period, its start date, the grounds for suspension and interruption, and the step to be taken in time must be shown clearly in the same file. A formal notice, a negotiation, the preservation of evidence and mediation do not produce the same result; the statute of limitations, the preclusive period and the procedural time limit also do not substitute for one another.

In particular, the 2026 partial-claim provisions and the transitional rule for pre-emption show that old information should not be used independently of the date of the file. A sound time-limit monitoring system is not completed by marking a date on the calendar: it requires the basis for that date, the step to be taken and a record showing that the step has been completed.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do I always have ten years to bring an action?

No. Ten years is the general period for claims for which there is no special provision under Article 146 TBK. Depending on the type of claim, shorter periods or periods with different starting points may apply. [1]

When limitation expires, is the debt completely extinguished?

As a rule, no. Limitation gives the debtor a defence; the judge cannot take it into account of its own motion. Whether the plea has been raised in the proper form, and whether the period has in fact expired, are assessed. [1]

Does the court take account of a preclusive period of its own motion?

Yes; this is one of the main differences from limitation. However, which right or step of application is affected, and the nature of the dismissal decision, must be determined by the relevant special provision. [2, 9]

Does sending a notarial formal notice interrupt limitation?

It is not a general ground of interruption by itself. A formal notice may have effect for default or for other rights; to protect limitation, Article 154 TBK and the special provisions must be separately examined. [1]

Does an application for mediation restart the period from zero?

Its general effect is not to restart the period from zero. In mediation as a condition precedent to suit, limitation is suspended during the statutory period from application to the final report, and the preclusive period does not run. The starting conditions for voluntary mediation are different. [6]

After mediation ends, must every action be brought within two weeks?

No. The two-week special period is for the cases provided for in the relevant regulation, such as reinstatement. For other claims, the remaining period and any other special provision are assessed. [4, 6]

Are one month and thirty days the same?

They are not always the same. The period the law gives in months is assessed according to the calculation provision that applies. The expressions days, weeks and months must not be arbitrarily converted into one another. [1, 2]

Are weekends excluded from the period calculation?

In the general calculation under the HMK, holidays are included in the period. The fact that the last day falls on a holiday is separately regulated. Special periods where the law expressly provides for working days are assessed separately. [2]

If I did not open the electronic service, does the period not start?

There is no such general result. Electronic service is deemed to have been made at the end of the fifth day after it reaches the account. The period for the step is calculated separately under its own starting rule. [7]

Does limitation stop during the judicial recess?

The judicial recess is not a general provision suspending all substantive-law periods. The scope of Article 104 HMK must be examined in light of the matters subject to the judicial recess and the time limits laid down by the Law. [2]

For the amount I increased in a partial action, on what date is limitation interrupted?

Under the current Article 109(4) HMK, for an increase made in accordance with its requirements, the increased part is also deemed interrupted on the date of the action. The one-time increase, the end of the investigation and the transitional provisions must be assessed together. The details of the 2026 amendment are set out in the main section. [2, 10]

Can an action for an uncertain claim no longer be brought?

Article 107 HMK was repealed with effect from 31 July 2026. However, actions brought before that date continue to be governed by it. The claim and the appropriate type of action for a new action must be determined under the current Article 109 and other provisions. [2, 10]

Is the upper period for pre-emption one year or two years?

The current rule is one year; the transitional provision for sales made before the change preserves the earlier rule. A three-month period linked to the notarial notice also applies. The dates of the sale and of the notice must be examined together. [3]

If I missed the period, is there necessarily an additional sixty-day period?

No. Article 158 TBK applies only in specific grounds of rejection and other statutory conditions. Restoration of the prior status does not revive every substantive-law period either. The actual calculation and the special route available must be determined first. [1, 2]

Sources and legal bases

1. Republic of Türkiye, Turkish Code of Obligations No. 6098, in particular Articles 72, 78, 82, 92–93 and 146–161. Current legislation text.
2. Republic of Türkiye, Code of Civil Procedure No. 6100, in particular Articles 20, 33, 90–109, 141–145, 176 et seq., 323–326, 400 et seq. and 448. Current legislation text.
3. Republic of Türkiye, Turkish Civil Code No. 4721, in particular Articles 571, 732–734 and Provisional Article 1. Current legislation text.
4. Republic of Türkiye, Labour Law No. 4857, in particular Articles 20, 32, Annex Article 3 and Provisional Article 8. Current legislation text.
5. Republic of Türkiye, Labour Courts Law No. 7036, in particular Article 3. Current legislation text.
6. Republic of Türkiye, Law No. 6325 on Mediation in Civil Disputes, in particular Articles 16 and 18/A. Current legislation text.
7. Republic of Türkiye, Notification Law No. 7201, in particular Articles 7(a) and 32. Current legislation text.
8. Republic of Türkiye, Law No. 6101 on the Implementation and Application of the Turkish Code of Obligations, in particular Articles 5–6. Legislation text.
9. Peksöz, Vildan, "The Characterisation of Preclusive Periods as Conditions of Action" (Hak Düşürücü Sürelerin Dava Şartı Olarak Nitelendirilme(me)si), Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University Faculty of Law Review (Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi), 28(1), 2024, pp. 101–126; in particular pp. 119–121. DOI: 10.34246/ahbvuhfd.1321324. Article.
10. Republic of Türkiye, Law No. 7589 on Amendments to Certain Laws concerning the Effective and Efficient Conduct of Justice, Articles 19–20, Provisional Article 1(10) and Article 26. Official Gazette, 31.07.2026, no. 33326. Legislation text.
11. Constitutional Court, General Assembly, Çetin Akboğa, Application No. 2019/430, 23.03.2023; in particular §§62–75. Official Gazette, 23.05.2023, no. 32199. Decision.
12. Republic of Türkiye, Private International and Procedural Law No. 5718, in particular Articles 2 and 8. Current legislation text.