The struggle for law means identifying the legal obstacles to exercising a right that has been violated, pursuing a reasoned objection, and making the outcome reached enforceable. The lawyer's courage becomes visible in carrying out this work independently, whether in the face of public opinion, the client, or the power of the State. The measure is not the size of the conflict; it is the right to be protected, the lawfulness of the method chosen, and the client's informed choice.
There is a distance between a right being written in the law and that right finding a counterpart in a person's life. Recognition of the violation, proof of it, bringing it before the competent authority and enforcement of the decision are all required. Time, money, information and the capacity to endure are not distributed equally across that distance. The social importance of the legal profession emerges in this passage between abstract law and concrete life.
However, the idea of the struggle for law does not on its own provide sufficient direction. Is it always right to pursue every dispute to the end? If a case has public value, must the client bear its cost? Does a lawyer who defends a person they think may have committed an offense move away from the ideal of justice? At what point does the language of the struggle cease to be defense and become personal hostility?
A eulogy of the legal profession that does not answer these questions may glorify the profession while blurring its responsibility. The lawyer's task is not merely to enlarge the struggle; it is to identify together the right to be protected, the path to be chosen and the method that cannot be accepted. The value of professional courage is understood to the extent that it preserves these distinctions.
Jhering's real question is how a right will be realized in life
At the beginning of the work known as The Struggle for Law by Rudolf von Jhering, a distinction is drawn between the purpose of law and the path to reaching that purpose: the purpose is peace, while what is necessary in the face of a violation of a right is struggle. In this approach law is not merely the logical order of rules; it is a social resource which, when necessary, is asserted and protected. [1, Chapter I]
Jhering's combination of the scales and the sword also explains this point: determining what a right is and protecting it effectively complement each other. If the power of enforcement is severed from measure, it can turn into oppression; if the finding of rightfulness remains ineffective, it can turn into a lack of protection. When this idea of struggle is carried over to the lawyer, what stands out is not physical force or hostility, but legal reasoning and a reviewable application. [1, Chapter I]
In the fourth chapter of the work, the relationship between individual right and the legal order is extended. A person defending their own right also concerns the social validity of the rule. An objection to injustice is thus assessed beyond mere personal interest. The enduring force of Jhering's thought lies in not leaving the protection of rights solely as an abstract duty of the State. [1, Chapter IV]
In the fifth chapter, Jhering expresses this reciprocal relationship concisely:
"He who defends his own right defends the law; he who defends the law defends his own right."
This sentence is a rendering of the meaning of the relevant chapter, as used here; it is not taken from a specific published edition. The simile in the same chapter, "The sense of law is the root of the whole tree," also describes how the will to assert rights feeds the legal order. A link is drawn between the existence of rules and the existence of people who can invoke them. [1, Chapter V]
I do not seek the present-day equivalent of this idea in a claim that every case creates a precedent binding on everyone. That a person can put forward a violation of the law may make it easier for others to name a similar problem and to formulate a reviewable claim. This social effect and the binding force of a particular decision are different matters. The value of an objection lies not in changing the entire order on its own, but in preventing the ordinary and unanswered tolerance of unlawfulness.
However, when carrying this approach into the present, one distinction must be preserved. The social importance of a right does not mean that a particular person must bring proceedings in every circumstance. Turning the freedom to seek rights into an obligation of heroism may push aside the life of the person who would exercise it. The interpretation I propose here is not a repetition of Jhering's historical thesis; it is a reassessment, in light of today's responsibility of the lawyer, of the debate he opened.
The legal route cannot be assessed independently of the life of the rights-holder
Strong legal grounds may exist for pursuing a dispute. Even so, the financial burden of the process, its effect on working relations, the person's needs and the nature of the expected remedy must be assessed separately. Discussing these matters does not diminish the value of the right; it allows the client to take the decision under real conditions.
The reverse is also possible. A dispute of low monetary value may matter greatly to the client in terms of protecting their reputation or ending a repeated practice. To dismiss such a choice merely on grounds of economic inefficiency would be for the lawyer to impose their own scale of value on the client.
Correct assessment means not tying all files to a single cost calculation or to a single ideal of struggle. The lawyer explains the legal possibilities and their consequences, and seeks to understand the client's protectable aim. The quality of the decision depends on the options having been genuinely understood.
Independent defense before the power of the State is a guarantee of the rule of law
A legal dispute may not be a field in which the parties meet with equal means. Where a public authority has the power to take a decision, to access information or to enforce sanctions, a person may find it difficult even to learn the reasons for a measure affecting them. The lawyer's contribution is to turn this disparity of power into legally arguable questions: On what power is the measure based? What supports the facts? Was the person's explanation heard? By what reasoning was the scope of the intervention determined?
The rule-of-law principle of the Constitution, the right of access to the courts, judicial review of administrative acts and the independence of the courts are the constitutional bases of this assessment. The scope and exceptions of the remedies are examined within their own regulations. Article 1 of the Attorneyship Law No. 1136 (Avukatlık Kanunu) defines the lawyer as a representative of independent defense, one of the constitutive elements of the judiciary. [9, Arts. 2, 36, 125, 138] [2, Art. 1]
Independence includes being able to maintain the legally necessary objection in the face of an inducement that may come from a court or an administration. The same responsibility applies in relation to the client's wishes. The client's anger does not grant authority to put a false claim into a petition; nor does public expectation justify announcing a result that the file does not support. The lawyer's professional judgment must be capable of being formed separately from each of these pressures.
Courage means taking responsibility for the legal objection
When a hearing is interrupted, a substantive request goes unanswered or access to the file is obstructed, the first need is to describe accurately what has happened. The act to which the objection is directed, the right it affects and what is requested must be stated clearly. Where appropriate, it is recorded in the file; existing remedies are assessed in terms of time limits and conditions. Raising one's voice and making an objection legally visible are not the same thing.
This approach does not create a lawyer who is fearless or who alone bears every risk. Where there are threats, intimidation or obstruction of professional activity, support and protective mechanisms must operate. The UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers (BM Avukatların Rolüne Dair Temel İlkeleri) emphasize that professional duties must be performed without intimidation or improper interference, and that lawyers whose security is threatened must be protected. The duty of bar associations to defend the rule of law and human rights is also part of this institutional framework. [4, Principles 16–17] [2, Art. 76]
Another aspect of professional courage is being able to revise one's own assessment. Accepting that a new document weakens the first view; telling the client plainly that a claim cannot be defended; and maintaining the limit where an unlawful method is requested — these are all required. The independent lawyer is first the person who bears responsibility for the claim they put forward, and only then the person who continually declares their rightfulness.
Contributing to the development of the law begins with describing the problem correctly
A lawyer must also be able to examine the problem created by the regulation they apply. Where the same obstacle recurs in different files, the regulation or the way it is applied beyond the individual act may be opened to debate. The path to this is to document the problem, examine the existing means of supervision and, where appropriate, justify a proposal for change through professional bodies or scholarly discussion. The claim of contributing to the development of the law acquires meaning where the concrete need and the proposed solution can be explained.
This responsibility does not give a lawyer the authority to represent the conscience of society alone. The rights-holder is the subject of their own life. Particularly where a child or a person who finds it difficult to express themselves in legal proceedings is concerned, the wish to speak on their behalf must not overshadow the duty to listen to them. Human sensitivity becomes professional value when it means understanding what happened, respecting the person's will and building the necessary legal support correctly.
Making the cost of seeking rights visible is not giving up on justice
The cost of seeking a right is not only court fees or lawyer's fees. The use of time, disruption to activities, the prolongation of uncertainty and the effects of the dispute on other relationships may also determine the client's decision. The lawyer cannot measure all these effects; but in describing the legal route, they must not describe only its possible gains and leave its burdens unspoken.
That a claim can legally be asserted does not in itself show that the same claim, at the chosen time and by the chosen route, is the most useful solution. A protective step, negotiation, mediation or a lawsuit may respond to different needs. Which route is possible is determined by the type of dispute and the relevant conditions; these are not options that may be freely substituted for one another in every file.
In this assessment, reversibility is also important. Some choices may be reconsidered later, while some steps may lead to loss of rights, admission or waiver. The client's wish to "finish the process" does not justify signing any document without the consequences being explained. The lawyer's task is to make visible not only the relief of the moment, but the subsequent legal effect of the decision.
An agreement may sometimes protect the right more effectively
Regarding agreement as weakness in every case, or litigation as firmness in every case, is not a professional standard. The nature of a solution depends on how far it meets the client's legally protectable need. To determine this, the scope of the agreement, its enforceability and the issues it leaves open must be examined.
On the other hand, the parties sitting down at the table does not in itself show that the negotiation took place under fair conditions. Lack of information, economic pressure or inequality of strength may lead a person to accept an outcome they do not really understand. The lawyer's contribution is not merely to facilitate the signature; it is to assess in what information and conditions consent was given.
Legal struggle should therefore not be understood merely as bringing an action. It includes bringing a suit where necessary, pursuing an existing remedy with determination where necessary, and considering an agreement with clear terms where appropriate. The professional value of each route must be sought in the reasoning specific to the file.
A lawyer cannot turn a client's case into a vehicle for their own ideal
The effect of some cases goes beyond the parties. Revealing the unlawfulness of a practice may also affect the efforts of people in similar situations to seek their rights. This public value is important. However, the lawyer's view of the law or their social objective cannot automatically push the client's will into the background.
As the symbolic meaning of a file grows, there is a risk that the person's own need becomes invisible. The client may then find that they wish only to protect a particular right while the public expects them to pursue a broader struggle. The lawyer, too, may identify their professional identity too closely with that struggle.
At this point, loyalty and public responsibility must be considered together. The lawyer may explain the probable social effect of the case; but they may not make that effect the justification for concealing the risks the client will bear. A decision to make a file visible, to announce it to the press or to pursue a particular strategy must be examined separately in terms of confidentiality, authority, the rights of the person concerned and the requirements of the proceedings.
The Attorneyship Law's approach to the profession as both a public service and a free profession requires considering together the client's interest and the requirements of justice. This duality does not give the lawyer unlimited power to dispose of the client's life. [2, Arts. 1–2]
The protection of the client's will requires considering together the loyalty and independence within the lawyer–client relationship.
Defending a person thought to be guilty: what does it mean to defend?
One of the oldest objections raised against the defense profession is this: "If you think they committed the crime, how can you defend them?" The question rests on the assumption that the lawyer's duty is only to speak for the innocence of persons they believe to be innocent. But the right to defense does not depend on the lawyer's personal conviction or on public sympathy for the person.
The legal proof of an accusation, the admissibility of evidence, the correct characterization of the offense, the determination of personal responsibility and the lawfulness of the sanction are different questions. The mere statement by a person that they carried out the act does not by itself resolve all of these questions. Criminal proceedings are not an exercise of preference as to for whom the limits of law will apply. [3]
The right to defense is not required merely to prevent the wrong person from being punished. It also concerns whether the right person is punished, for the right act, by the right procedure and to the extent the law allows. Otherwise there arises the idea that a person who has committed a crime no longer needs any guarantee. The limiting function of law matters most precisely where the power to punish is strong.
The ethical limit of defense lies between legal scrutiny and distorting the truth
The defense counsel may argue that the allegation has not been proved, object to the use of unlawfully obtained evidence, or dispute the legal characterization. These fall within the field of action that the legal order grants to the defense. By contrast, fabricating a forged document, pressing a witness to make a false statement, or falsely attributing a crime to another person does not form part of the defense function.
Information that a client gives to their lawyer concerns the duty of confidentiality and the defense path to be followed. The lawyer cannot turn the client's private account into a criminal judgment; nor can they regard it as professional loyalty to produce false evidence on the basis of that account. There is a fundamental distinction between silence, confidentiality and legal objections on the one hand, and actively producing misleading facts on the other. [2, Arts. 34, 36] [3, Arts. 46, 147–148]
Maintaining this distinction is at times a task that is difficult to explain to the public. A lawyer's defense of a person does not show that they approve of every act of that person. Article 18 of the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers provides that lawyers should not be identified with their clients or their clients' causes because of the performance of their functions. This text is not a Turkish statute or a criminal norm applicable directly; it is an international principled document on the independence of the legal profession. [4]
How this principled distinction is reflected in a file becomes concrete through the relationship between accusation, evidence and proof in criminal defense.
Two historical defenses show different tests of the profession
It is easy to narrate the history of defense through impressive sentences attributed to famous names. What is more instructive is to examine what responsibility the lawyer concretely undertook and which distinction they preserved. Historical examples do not give direct procedural rules for today's law; they help us think about the tensions the profession faces.
John Adams: independence of defense in the face of public reaction
John Adams's own account of undertaking the defense of Captain Preston and the soldiers after the 1770 Boston events shows that the professional task could conflict with the need for acceptance in public opinion. Adams also records the suspicion and reaction his role provoked against himself. [5]
The professional standard that can be drawn from this example is not that the lawyer must oppose the public on every question. It is that legal assistance must not be withheld according to whether the person represented is liked. Society may hold a strong view; yet the task of the trial remains to examine the event within the evidence and the law. The historical events and the criminal procedure of today must not be confused with one another.
Clarence Darrow: the goal of defense is not always acquittal
In Clarence Darrow's closing argument in the 1924 Leopold–Loeb case, it is plainly apparent that the clients' release was not sought; the protection of their lives was requested. Thus the focus of the debate moves from asserting that the act did not take place in any way toward the nature of the punishment and the death penalty. [6, especially §§23–31]
The important distinction here is that the value of defense cannot be measured only by acquittal. However, this historical speech does not mean that the American practice of admitting guilt can be transferred as it stands to Türkiye. Nor is every expression of a historical defense necessarily to be adopted today. The function of defense in disputing the limits of punishment and the speaker's rhetorical choices should be read separately.
What the two examples have in common is not to make the lawyer a legend. In one, legal assistance is provided despite public pressure; in the other, the limits of the request for punishment are made visible. Both suggest why defense has an independent function in the legal order.
The language of struggle must not dehumanize the opposing party
In a legal dispute a sharp criticism may be required. The clear unlawfulness of an act may be shown; the inadequacy of reasoning, the contradiction in a witness statement or the fragility of an allegation may be asserted firmly. But the strength of a legal objection does not increase with the number of demeaning descriptions applied to a person.
Articles 5 and 6 of the Professional Rules of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (Türkiye Barolar Birliği Meslek Kuralları) require the lawyer to make statements in a mature and objective manner, to engage with the legal issue, and to remain outside hostilities between parties. This framework does not require silently accepting an erroneous decision. Its aim is to allow an objection to be pursued without becoming a personal attack. [7]
The immunity for allegations and defenses under Article 128 of the Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 (TCK) is not unlimited freedom to insult. Applications before judicial or administrative bodies must have allegations and assessments within the scope of the allegations and defenses that are based on real and concrete facts and are connected with the dispute. The fact that a statement appears in a petition does not show that all the necessary conditions are met. [8]
The practical meaning of this distinction is clear. Instead of a general assessment that "the other side is unreliable", it must be shown which statement contradicts which document. Instead of saying "the court did not hear us", it must be explained which essential request was raised at which stage and why it was not assessed. Sharpening the language does not weaken legal criticism; it makes it debatable and reviewable.
Morice v. France: when is sharp criticism protected?
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (AİHM) in Morice v. France clarifies the limits of a lawyer's criticism of the functioning of the judiciary. The applicant lawyer had been convicted for public criticism of judges who had conducted an investigation. The Court found a violation of freedom of expression, assessing the context of the statements, the public interest and whether there was a sufficient factual basis. [10, §§174–178]
The judgment does not grant a general immunity for every sharp statement. The Court distinguishes between defense in the courtroom and the statement made outside it; it examines the relationship between the lawyer's effective performance of their duties, confidence in the judiciary and the rights of others. It can be seen that an unfounded personal attack and legal criticism based on facts cannot be assessed in the same way. [10, §§128–139]
For that reason, it is not correct either to carry the rule in Article 128 of the TCK automatically into press statements, or to regard every criticism outside the courtroom as unprotected. The conditions of the different legal protections must be examined separately. The professional lesson for lawyers is this: the sharpness of criticism matters, but so does the fact that it rests on facts and makes visible the legal question concerned.
A public statement and a defense before the court are not the same text
The legal function of a petition and the effect of a post on social media are different. Information presented in a file for a specific examination may, when made public, have other consequences for a person's reputation, private life or the health of the proceedings. Being submitted to a court therefore does not by itself make the sharing of a document with everyone lawful.
Before making a public statement, the lawyer must determine its purpose. Is it to explain a legal guarantee, to correct false information, or to state the limits of the client's position? If the purpose is not determined, the statement may be shaped more by the desire for visibility than by the needs of the file.
Professional independence is also protected in the face of the press and public opinion. It is not obligatory to join every debate or to respond immediately to every accusation in order to defend the client's rights. The timing, scope and lawfulness of a statement must be assessed before its impact.
Access to justice is not secured merely by the door being open
The existence of a right of application does not in every case show that a person can effectively use that right. Being unable to define a legal problem, not knowing which authority to approach, or lacking the economic means to bear the costs of the process may make access more difficult. The public dimension of the legal profession requires taking this difference seriously.
Legal aid and the appointment of counsel in criminal procedure must not be confused within this framework. Their legal bases, conditions and operation are different. The appointment on request and mandatory defense provisions of Article 150 of the Criminal Procedure Code No. 5271 (CMK) and the legal aid system of the Attorneyship Law are assessed within their own scope. Telling a person merely that "you can get a free lawyer" is not enough; the conditions and the route of application that apply must be explained. [2, Art. 176 et seq.] [3, Art. 150]
The quality of professional care cannot be reduced depending on who pays the fee for the appointment. Article 46 of the Professional Rules of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations requires legal aid work to be carried out with the same care as other work. The principle here is not to grade the moral value of legal services by ability to pay. [7]
This question also concerns the nature of legal writing. Giving the reader only the name of a concept does not teach them what question they should ask. Good legal information should enable a person to describe their own situation more accurately and to seek help at the right stage. Citing sources, explaining limits and not making the uncertain appear certain are the publishing counterparts of this public responsibility.
Today's legal struggle must make the right usable and the result enforceable
The present-day equivalent of the struggle for law is most often seen in the procedural work that precedes a great courtroom speech. Investigating when and how a decision was served, asking for the protection of a record that may be lost, making concrete an obstacle to access to a file, or bringing back into the centre of legal debate a substantive request that has gone unanswered: these make the opportunity to seek a right actually protected. This work turns abstract thinking about justice into a workable procedure.
Turning abstract resolve into work to be done in the file
The examples below are not instructions for a particular case, nor a common list of procedures for all disputes. Their purpose is to show how the responsibility to seek a right becomes a concrete working question.
| Problem encountered | Matter the lawyer must clarify | Opportunity being protected |
|---|---|---|
| Start of the process or date of notification unclear | The document of notification, its method and the start of the relevant period | The right of application can be used in time |
| An important record may be lost | Who holds the record and the legally available means of protecting or requesting it | The claim or defense can be proved |
| A substantive request has gone unanswered | Where the request sits in the file, the scope of the decision and the open route of review | The objection becomes capable of examination |
| A decision has been given but the expected change has not occurred | The scope and enforceability of the decision and the subsequent competent action | The recognized right can actually be exercised |
This work also strengthens communication with the client. Instead of the phrase "we are fighting", one can explain what is being investigated, which request has been put forward and what the subsequent decision depends on. Uncertainty may not disappear completely; but the path being followed becomes understandable.
After the first unfavorable decision, the reasoning of the objection must be rebuilt
Repeating the same petition in harsher language after a request has been rejected does not always produce progress. First, it must be examined which question the rejection answered. Was the request understood but legally not accepted? Was a document that could affect the outcome left out of consideration? Is there an obstacle as to the time, the authority or the procedure of the application? These distinctions determine the reasoning of the continuing struggle and the route that may be used.
The lawyer's determination is not measured solely by holding on to their own first view in every circumstance. Being able to confront the reasoning of an adverse decision, to develop a new legal explanation in a changed file and, where necessary, to correct an earlier choice are also part of determination. The client must be told at which point the position is being maintained and what it may change. It cannot be assumed that every application suspends every consequence, or that every decision is open to the same route of review; the conditions of the chosen route are determined separately.
The distance between a decision and the right taking effect in life must be monitored
The recognition of a right does not always coincide in time with the actual realization of the result the client sought. Payment, the correction of a transaction or the ending of a particular conduct may each be matters requiring separate follow-up. The type of step to be followed, the content of the decision and the conditions of its implementation vary from file to file. For this reason, post-decision work should be assessed by returning to the legal objective identified at the start.
This approach matters in the wording of an agreement too. If it is left unclear who will perform what, when and how, the dispute may end on paper while continuing in practice. A strong legal outcome requires thinking about the next step as well. The professional value of a struggle is understood by what it protects, corrects or makes possible again in the life of the rights-holder.
The lawyer's success cannot be defined solely by the result won
Preventing a violation of rights, abandoning a mistaken application, lifting an unnecessary measure, or ending a dispute with an enforceable solution may not be sufficiently visible in the classic narrative of "winning the case". Yet these may have important consequences in the client's life.
This observation must not be used to regard the outcomes as trivial. The client should not forget that they sought legal assistance for a particular need. The lawyer should be able to explain how the work carried out served that need. Saying only that effort was spent does not answer whether the right method was followed.
When assessing success, the initial information, the foreseeable risks, the steps taken in time and the developments that emerged later must be examined together. A good result does not legitimate every method; an unfavorable result does not in every case prove that negligence occurred. Professional accountability requires drawing these distinctions on the basis of the concrete file.
Here the ethics of the struggle for law becomes clear: taking the client's right seriously and, at the same time, bearing responsibility for the method used in their name. Resolve must not be confused with unreasoned persistence; loyalty with unlimited obedience; courage with disproportion.
The daily labor of freedom is visible in the daily care of the profession
In the second part of Goethe's Faust, there is the idea of freedom and of life being won anew each day:
"Only he who wins them anew every day deserves life and freedom."
This is a rendering of the meaning of lines 11575–11576, as used here; it is not attributed to any named translator or edition. Jhering too expresses the same thought at the end of his work. But a dramatic phrase in a literary work cannot be turned into a rule of law that people must struggle in order to have rights. Freedom also belongs to a person who lacks the strength to defend it. [11] [1, Chapter VI]
For the purposes of this article, what the lines suggest is that the institutional protection of freedom requires continuous effort. Not becoming indifferent to the rights of others, not regarding an unlawful practice as ordinary, and asking for the justification of the authority exercised in the name of law are parts of that effort. In the legal profession the same responsibility appears in reading the file carefully, in understanding what a person is saying, and in monitoring the details which, if neglected, could make the right unusable.
Here the link between the abstract value of justice and the daily work of the profession is established. The time devoted to understanding a human being, the thoroughness that examines the foundation of a petition, and the will to sustain a reasoned objection even when standing alone are different faces of the same responsibility.
The struggle for law extends to the right taking effect in life
The distance at the beginning of this article lay between the right recognized in law and a person's ability to actually exercise it. The lawyer's work gains meaning to the extent that it reduces that distance: by protecting the time limit, by investigating evidence in time, by making unlawfulness concrete, by debating unreasoned decisions, and by monitoring what the decision obtained has changed.
This responsibility does not leave the functions of the courts and other public bodies to the shoulders of the lawyer. Each institution must account for its authority within the law. The social value of independent defense lies in the existence of a professional will that makes it possible for this account to be demanded and for the objection to be heard. The reasoning used in defending a person's right touches also on the question of how the legal order should treat everyone.
For me, the struggle for law is a determined work carried out without belittling the client's right, without concealing the cost they will bear, and without taking over their will. Where there is strong reasoning, the objection is pursued; where there is new information, the method is reviewed; where a possibility of settlement arises, its conditions are seriously examined. At every stage the same responsibility is preserved: defending the right while remaining within the limits established by law, and considering the effect of the path used on the client's life.
The struggle for law is not completed by declaring that one is right; it is completed by the professional persistence shown in protecting the right, remedying the violation and implementing the result obtained. The most valuable trace a lawyer leaves is this protection, which continues to exist in a person's life even after the last word spoken in a file.
Sources and approach to the historical texts
- Rudolf von Jhering, The Struggle for Law, translated by John J. Lalor, second edition, Callaghan and Company, Chicago, 1915; Chapter I, Chapter IV, Chapter V and Chapter VI. A source of historical legal thought. Assessments of present-day client autonomy and professional responsibility are the interpretation of this article.
- Attorneyship Law No. 1136 (1136 sayılı Avukatlık Kanunu), Arts. 1–2, 34, 36, 76 and 176 et seq. References are limited to the stated provisions; subsequent amendments to the disciplinary provisions are outside the subject of this article.
- Criminal Procedure Code No. 5271 (5271 sayılı Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu), in particular Arts. 46, 147–150, 217 and 223; Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası), Arts. 36 and 38.
- United Nations, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, 1990, in particular Principles 16–18; text on the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library. Used as an international principled document.
- John Adams, autobiographical account, "[1770]"; Massachusetts Historical Society, Adams Papers Digital Edition. The source of the historical account is Adams's own text; no general conclusion is drawn about the outcomes of proceedings or fee figures.
- Clarence Darrow, "Plea for Leopold and Loeb", August 22, 23 and 25, 1924; University of Maryland, Voices of Democracy, speech text, in particular §§23–31. The historical speech is the defense counsel's own position; none of the factual assessments in it is accepted as an independent finding of a court.
- Professional Rules of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (Türkiye Barolar Birliği Meslek Kuralları), Arts. 1–6 and 46.
- Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 (5237 sayılı Türk Ceza Kanunu), Ministry of Justice legislation record, Art. 128.
- Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye, current text page of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM), in particular Arts. 2, 36, 125 and 138; PDF accessed from the page.
- European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Morice v. France, application no. 29369/10, April 23, 2015, in particular §§128–139 and 174–178; HUDOC case record, official full text. It should not be confused with the Chamber judgment of 2013.
- Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust. Der Tragödie zweiter Teil, Act V, "Großer Vorhof des Palasts", lines 11575–11576; German text, Wikisource. The Turkish rendering is a rendering of meaning; it is not attributed to any unknown Turkish translator or edition.
This article offers an assessment between legal philosophy and current professional responsibilities. It does not replace a review of the file for the continuation or conclusion of a particular case, or for the choice of a particular method of defense.