When a statute is enacted, society’s disagreements about justice do not come to an end. When a court rules, not everyone shares the same view about whether the ruling is correct. Even so, life goes on; institutions must act, people must determine their conduct and society must live under common rules. This is exactly where the difficulty of law emerges: On what ground can a decision we cannot agree on be binding on all of us?
Jeremy Waldron’s approach in Law and Disagreement discusses this question through the meaning of rights and the authority to make democratic decisions. It accepts that citizens committed to rights may differ seriously about the scope of those same rights, and it assesses the distribution of authority between the legislature and the judiciary under this condition of disagreement. [1]
The starting point of this article is as follows: The success of law should be measured not only by its ability to decide a dispute, but also by its ability to protect the equality, the rights and the opportunity to object of the person who ends up on the losing side of the decision. To develop this idea, it is necessary first to address the nature of disagreement, then the majority decision and judicial review, and finally the limits of the debate with respect to Türkiye.
This review evaluates the book’s main theses together with the author’s later work and the critical literature. Waldron’s articles of 2006 and 2009 are treated within their own historical contexts. The comparison with Turkish law, the professional implications and the examples that are expressly constructed as hypotheticals are assessments we have developed within the framework of this discussion.
Law Establishes the Conditions for Living Together with Disagreement
Resolving a Dispute Versus Ending Disagreement
The legal resolution of a dispute and people finding one another to be in the right are different outcomes. A court can rule on the claim before it. But that ruling does not have to change the parties’ moral assessments or the meaning they attach to what they experienced. The same distinction can be considered for statutes that concern society as a whole.
Suppose, for example, that we are debating until what hour loud events may be held in a residential area. One group may emphasize cultural life and freedom of expression; another may emphasize rest, the peace of the home and the needs of children. A decision is unavoidable. But the fact that a decision has been made does not show that all of these reasons have merged into a single view.
In this example, what can be expected of law is to make the different interests visible, to weigh the reasons, to create a workable rule and to keep open the avenues through which that rule can be questioned. Sustaining common life while disagreement continues is, in itself, a legal achievement.
The Circumstances of Politics and the Need for a Common Decision
Waldron’s idea of the “circumstances of politics” rests on the coexistence of the need for a common decision and disagreement over the content of that decision. Alexander Latham-Gambi, in his study of this concept, stresses that focusing only on disagreement may overshadow the need for common action. [2] The point, therefore, is to be able to explain the conditions of acting together while accepting that disagreements exist.
Consensus is valuable; it can produce solutions that better take the parties’ needs into account. Nevertheless, making every common decision depend on everyone’s approval may also make a deadlock permanent. The consequences of indecision may not be distributed equally. The continuation of the existing order is not a neutral wait for a person who is harmed by that order.
From this follows the following assessment: A legitimate decision procedure must both allow time for debate and be able to produce a decision when necessary. Hearing an objection and postponing a decision indefinitely are not the same thing. The institutional capacity of a legal order should be sought in its ability to decide and to keep the decision open to criticism at the same time.
Rights and Disagreement of Principle in Jeremy Waldron’s Approach
Law and Disagreement was published by Oxford University Press in 1999. The Turkish edition was published under the title Hukuk ve Anlaşmazlık, translated by Emrah Denizhan, by Fol Kitap in October 2026. The work addresses the relationship among the legal philosophy of legislation, disagreement of principle, rights and judicial review. [1] [3]
One of Waldron’s main contributions is that, when thinking about the content of a just order, he also puts forward, as an independent question, how people who cannot agree on that content are to decide together. The search for truth in the theory of justice and the responsibility of political institutions to produce common decisions must be addressed together. [4]
Commitment to Rights and Disagreement over the Interpretation of Rights
Accepting a right may not be enough to determine what that right requires in every case. Two people who defend freedom of expression may differ on how a statement that singles out a target should be assessed. Two people who defend equality may reach different conclusions on whether a differentiated measure aimed at a disadvantaged group is fair.
Such disagreements make it harder to assume at once that the other side rejects rights altogether. Sometimes the debate is over how the same value should be understood. However, this observation does not mean that every claim is equally defensible. Distorting evidence, justifying discrimination or denying the equal status of others does not remove the responsibility to assess the reasons.
In a debate about rights, it is useful to separate two levels: which protection is correct, and which institution is to give the binding decision on it, by what procedure. Waldron’s separation of believing in rights from adopting a particular bill of rights and protection regime makes this second level visible. [5]
Moral Truth and Decision-Making Authority Are Separate Questions
Waldron argues that accepting moral objectivity does not by itself resolve the continuing disagreement about rights or the question of decision-making authority. Believing that a truth exists does not, on its own, show who is authorized to determine that truth in a binding manner. [6]
We can illustrate this distinction with a thought experiment. Imagine two panels that have all the information about the same event. Both aim at justice, yet they reach different decisions on how to strike the relationship between liberty and security. We may believe that one of the panels is right. Even so, to which one decision-making authority will be given, how its members will be selected and how its errors will be corrected must be justified separately.
Therefore, the existence of disagreement does not mean that every view is correct. Likewise, our confidence that our own view is correct is not enough to remove others from their place in the decision process. The distance between believing that one is right and having the authority to decide on behalf of others lies at the center of the debate on democratic legitimacy.
Waldron’s Debate with Rawls and Dworkin
Rawls and Disagreement over the Principles of Justice
In the seventh chapter of the book, Waldron examines John Rawls’s political liberalism through the relationship between differences over what a good life is and disagreement over the basic principles of justice. At the center of the debate is that people who differ in their religious or philosophical worldviews may also differ about the foundations on which the common political order should rest. The questions of public reason and overlapping consensus are addressed in this context. [7]
We can explain the importance of this distinction with a hypothetical example. People may jointly defend the protection of the right to education; yet they may think differently about whether equality of opportunity, need or individual choice should take priority in distributing resources. Using a common language of rights does not by itself determine the content of the regulation to be applied. In such a case, reducing the debate to different conceptions of life living side by side leaves open the question of how just institutions are to be built.
The assessment that can be drawn from this is that, alongside the search for consensus, the limits of consensus must also be considered. Even if it is possible to meet on some common principles, concretizing those principles may give rise to new disagreements. Decision procedures must be justified in a way that allows these disagreements to be debated and settled in a common decision. The focus of the review is at what level the disagreement continues and what consequence it has for political decision-making.
Dworkin and the Democratic Value of Rights
In the ninth chapter, Waldron assesses Ronald Dworkin’s approach of integrity, to use the English term, in terms of fairness and decision-making authority in a society where there are different views about justice. [8] The thirteenth chapter examines the distinction between the rights that constitute the democratic process and the rights that supply the necessary conditions for the legitimacy of that process. [9]
Starting from this framework, two questions need to be kept separate. The first is which rights are necessary for democratic life. The second is who is to give the binding interpretation when disagreement arises over the scope of those rights. For example, protecting the ability to express one’s political opinion and to take part in decisions makes democratic debate possible. Yet different assessments may again arise as to which regulations will secure those possibilities.
In our view, the strong question here is this: Does accepting that a right is a condition of democracy, by itself, determine to which institution the authority to interpret that right should be given? The institutional choice must be defended separately in terms of the protection of rights, the equal standing of citizens, the giving of reasons for decisions and the correctability of errors. Reading the debate between Dworkin and Waldron through these questions makes it possible to assess together the democratic value of rights and the question of authority over those rights.
Democratic Legitimacy Requires Equal Participation
The Citizen as a Rights-Holder and a Participant in Decisions
Waldron gives the right of participation a special place. This place does not rest on the claim that participation is morally superior to all other rights. It is explained through the appropriateness of rights-holders who disagree about the content of rights taking part in determining that content. [10]
This approach raises an important point: believing that a decision about a person is in that person’s interest is not the same as giving that person a voice in the decision process. An order that aims to protect people’s interests should also care about their being able to present reasons about their own lives.
For participation to be meaningful, it cannot be considered sufficient that the opportunity to express a view is recognized on paper. An objection must be able to reach the relevant institution, be understood and find a place in the assessment. For example, if a public consultation process is designed so that only people who command technical language and have time can access it, a problem may arise between formal openness and actual participation. This calls for considering the right of participation separately in terms of institutional design.
Majority Decisions and the Correctness of the Decision
Majority voting is a method of producing decisions. It cannot be concluded from the result of a vote that the decision has resolved all moral problems. Waldron’s discussion of legislation, authority and voting turns to the question of by what process a proposal that has been deliberated becomes a source of law. [11]
For this reason, when evaluating the majority principle, looking only at the result of the votes is insufficient. Who could vote, how the options were formed, whether the opposing view could be expressed and whether the decision could be reviewed in the future must also be included in the assessment.
A structure in which the same group is persistently left out of participation and a structure in which everyone takes part with equal status but a particular proposal receives less support do not carry the same legitimacy problem. In the first, what is debated is among whom and under what conditions the decision was formed; in the second, the outcome of a decision that emerged within equal participation. The defensibility of a democratic decision also requires that the losing side remain equal citizens.
Correctness, Legitimacy and Legality
As a conceptual distinction, three questions should be kept apart. Whether a decision is just concerns its content. Whether the authority that made the decision can justify its competence and the procedure it used is a matter of legitimacy. Whether the decision conforms to the legal rules in force requires a legal assessment. These areas influence one another, but no automatic identity can be established among them.
Thinking that a decision is unjust does not prove that it is legally invalid in itself. Nor does a decision’s having come from a competent authority show that its content cannot be criticized. This distinction helps both a strong defense of rights and the correct allocation of institutional responsibility.
The Value of Legislation Lies in Carrying Different Views into a Common Decision
Representation and Polyphony
Waldron regards the size of the legislative assembly and the diversity of representation among the features that should be considered in thinking about the production of law. That debate in the assembly is bound by procedure and that different views are turned into a statutory text matter for the authority of legislation. [12] [13]
Starting from this observation, it is possible to evaluate a good legislative process as one in which the reasons behind the text can be traced. Which problem was meant to be solved? Which options were eliminated? Why was a group’s objection not accepted? How were the difficulties that might arise in practice discussed? These questions open to examination not only the result of a statute but also its formation.
If the statement of reasons of a bill merely announces the will of its supporters, the capacity for collective deliberation weakens. Engaging the opposing view at its strongest also makes the limits of the preferred solution visible. This approach does not require adopting every demand of the opposition; it requires explaining why a rejected demand was rejected.
The Legislator’s Intent and the Interpretation of Statutes
The matter Waldron addresses in the sixth chapter is how modern legislative activity is to be understood in terms of intention and interpretation. That an assembly is consciously organized does not show that every statute it adopts can be explained as the will of a single person. The chapter in particular questions resorting to the intentions of particular members of the legislature as a general method of statutory interpretation. [14]
We can make this problem concrete with a hypothetical example. One member of parliament may support the same regulation because it strengthens equality, another because it will bring economic benefit, and another because it will facilitate administrative procedures. The adopted text is common; the reasons supporting it differ. Therefore, it is hard to infer from the outcome of the vote that all members adopted the same purpose and the same practical consequences.
The methodological suggestion that can be drawn here for interpretation is a careful establishment of the relationship among the text of the statute, the purpose of the regulation, its statement of reasons and the legislative debates. The assumption that a single speech represents the will of the entire assembly must be justified separately. A lawyer should state clearly whose the data on which the interpretation rests is, what it shows and how far it can be carried. This care makes the interpretation of a statute born of a polyphonic process more open to scrutiny.
Expert Knowledge and Public Choice
Technical knowledge helps in understanding the likely effects of a decision. But deciding to what extent an effect is acceptable may also require making judgments about values and priorities.
For example, in a hypothetical digital surveillance regulation, experts can explain the error rate of the system. Whether the effect of that error on people will be accepted, which safeguards are necessary and on whom the burden is concentrated must be debated separately. The quality of expert opinion and the legitimacy of public choice must therefore be examined together. A good decision process brings knowledge into the debate while also making the value choice visible.
The Final Say on Rights and Judicial Review
Strong and Weak Judicial Review
The target of Waldron’s 2006 article is essentially strong judicial review: the court’s power to decline to apply a statute, to modify its effect or to strike it down on the ground that it violates rights. In the author’s distinction, weak review allows the conformity of a statute with rights to be examined, but does not include the power to decline to apply the statute, or to alter its effect in application, merely because of such a violation. This debate does not mean rejecting all adjudication or the review of the administration’s compliance with the law. [15]
The Meaning of Disagreement among Judges
As Waldron reminds us, disagreement over the meaning of rights may continue when it is carried to the court as well. The differing assessments of judges do not remove the interpretive question behind the institutional decision. [1]
It does not follow that a court and a parliament are the same kind of institution. The functions of the institutions, the way their members are selected, their decision processes and their burdens of justification must be assessed separately. The presence of voting as a shared method does not erase all of these differences.
The real question is how it will be justified which institution acts, and with what authority, in a particular debate about rights. The court’s decision that provides legal certainty and society’s intellectual debate about that decision can continue on separate planes. The authority to have the final say does not mean that the decision cannot be criticized.
Legal Expertise and the Authority to Make Moral Judgments
In his 2009 article Judges as Moral Reasoners, Waldron questions the assumption that judges are inherently superior in resolving moral issues. He does not attribute the problem to the personal inadequacy of judges; he focuses on how the judicial role, texts and precedents shape the debate about rights. [16]
When we assess this criticism from the standpoint of legal practice, two sides appear. Legal method can provide a discipline that prevents arbitrary decisions. The same method may also lead some public choices to be debated only within particular legal categories. Rather than absolutizing one of these possibilities in advance, we should examine to what extent a concrete institution opens or narrows the debate.
Therefore, both defending and criticizing courts carry a serious burden of justification. Trust in an institution does not remove the need to assess how the institution works and what effect its decision has on rights.
Constitutional Limits and Democratic Precommitment
A Society’s Limiting Its Own Future Decisions
Another argument in favor of judicial review is that a society can, through a constitution, set limits in advance on its future decisions. In his discussion of precommitment, Waldron states that the adoption of a constitutional order in accordance with the principle of participation and the democratic character of the decision-making mechanism that order creates must be assessed separately. [17]
This matter allows us to think about the relationship between the decision-making domain of a temporary majority and the continuity of common life. People may want certain rights to be protected from ordinary political change. Such a choice offers serious justification for constitutional limits. Even so, the question of who will determine the concrete scope of the protected right remains.
For example, guaranteeing freedom of expression does not mean deciding in advance on every means of communication and every interference that will arise in the future. New events may require reinterpretation of how the general principle is to be applied. There is therefore a distance, to be considered carefully, between adopting a constitutional text and assuming that all of its applications were accepted in advance.
Guarantees of Rights and Democratic Reconsideration
In this debate, two needs must be kept in view together: the resilience of rights against temporary pressures, and citizens’ continued ability to have a say about the common order. Treating every demand for change as a threat to rights, and treating every constitutional limitation as an obstacle to the democratic will, both assess this relationship incompletely.
The question of institutional design is, in addition to whether limits will exist, how those limits will be interpreted and how they can be reconsidered through lawful means. Seen this way, a constitution can be treated as an order of common authority and guarantee whose connection with the living society must be continually explained.
The Validity of Waldron’s Critique Depends on Institutional Conditions
Well-Functioning Institutions and Commitment to Rights
In his 2006 article, Waldron specifies four assumptions: [15]
- Reasonably well-functioning democratic institutions, including representation based on universal adult suffrage.
- A reasonably well-functioning judiciary that resolves disputes and upholds the rule of law.
- A commitment to individual and minority rights among most members of society and most public officials.
- Persisting, substantial and good-faith disagreement about the scope of rights.
When these conditions break down, the applicability of the counter-argument is reassessed; it does not follow that judicial review is automatically justified. [15]
Examining How Institutions Actually Work
This conditionality makes the assessment concrete. Can opposition views be freely expressed? Do voters face real choices? Can the objections of people affected by a rights violation reach the institutions? Can the judiciary independently examine the claim brought before it?
Without knowing the answers to these questions, it is hard to carry an abstract institutional preference over to all societies. Moreover, one institution’s failure does not by itself prove that another’s succeeds. What judicial review can do in the face of the legislature’s shortcomings, and to what extent democratic channels work in the face of the judiciary’s shortcomings, must also be investigated. Institutional trust should rest not on the name of the institution but on working conditions that can be justified.
Criticisms Directed at Waldron’s Approach
Estlund and the Legitimacy of the Decision Procedure
David Estlund directs the idea of disagreement in Waldron’s approach at the decision procedure as well. If views about justice, rights and legitimacy are open to reasonable objection, the view that defends the authority of majority procedure cannot be kept outside this debate either. Estlund argues that there is a tension that needs explaining among authority justifiable to everyone, deep disagreement and fair majoritarian procedures. [18]
The question this criticism prompts is clear: If we resort to a particular procedure because we cannot agree on the content of the decision, what will we do when we cannot agree on the procedure itself? In our view, this question reinforces the burden of explaining separately why the majority principle is considered fair. Justifying equal participation, representation and the way views are weighed therefore retains its importance.
Posner and How Institutions Actually Function
Richard A. Posner, in his review of the book, finds Waldron’s theoretical critique of judicial review strong; on the other hand, he says Waldron is too optimistic about the legislature and does not give enough weight to how the American judicial system actually works. He emphasizes that weakening some philosophical defenses of judicial review does not prove that abandoning the practice would be better. [19]
Starting from this objection, the institutional comparison needs to be made concrete. Alongside the fact that a parliament is elected, its capacity for deliberation, the influence of the opposition and the scrutability of the reasons for its decisions must also be assessed. Similarly, a court’s expertise alone does not give sufficient information about the quality of its decisions. The comparison should explain which errors institutions can prevent under which conditions.
Schwartzberg and the Idealization of the Legislature
Melissa Schwartzberg highlights the book’s idea of equal respect for the judgments of citizens and legislatures. At the same time, she argues that Waldron’s depiction of legislatures as free of problems may limit the explanatory power of his institution-focused approach. [20]
This criticism completes the section on institutional conditions in our article. Defending the democratic value of legislation does not require regarding every existing legislative process as adequate. The criteria of actual participation explained in the previous section are decisive, particularly for the protection of minority rights.
Minority Rights and the Strong Objection in Favor of Judicial Review
The Situation of Persistent Losers
One of the hardest questions of majority decision is that certain people bear the burden of the decision again and again. If a community is always ineffective on matters that concern it, the formal equality of the right to vote may not be enough to explain this situation.
Consider, for example, a regulation affecting a small group’s access to public services. A cost that looks small to the majority may be, for members of that group, an obstacle that shapes daily life. In such a case, calculating only total support may make the intensity of the burden invisible. A detailed examination of whom a decision affects therefore matters for the protection of rights.
This is a serious question that can be put to Waldron’s approach: if the opportunity to participate does not translate into being effectively heard, what additional guarantee will be provided to the rights-holder? The answer requires assessing together the quality of representation and the avenues of application and review.
Protection of Rights by More Than One Institution
Richard H. Fallon argues that, to defend judicial review, it need not be shown that courts are necessarily more successful than the legislature at defining rights. He contends that legislature and judiciary taking on a protective role together may prevent some errors that could lead to rights violations. He also separately considers situations in which stronger protection of one right weakens another. [21]
This counter-view moves the debate to a productive point: in institutional design, what matters is not only who will decide more correctly but also which errors lead to which consequences. That a decision can later be changed does not show that all the harm incurred in the meantime can be remedied.
In our view, every institution that protects rights must be able to explain both the justification of its authority and the possibility of correcting its error. A majority decision must be able to hear the minority’s objection; a judicial decision, too, must keep its reasoning open to criticism. These two expectations offer an assessment that takes democratic participation and guarantees of rights seriously together.
The Constitutional Framework with Respect to Türkiye
In this section we compare Waldron’s approach with Türkiye’s constitutional order in force. The assessments here are not a report of the views that the book puts forward about Türkiye.
Democratic Authority and the Binding Force of the Constitution
In Türkiye, Article 2 of the Constitution provides for the democratic state governed by the rule of law; Articles 6 and 7 regulate the exercise of sovereignty in accordance with constitutional principles and the legislative power of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye (TBMM). Article 11 binds all organs of the state to the Constitution. Article 13 subjects restrictions on rights to safeguards, including legality, non-interference with the essence of the right and proportionality. [22]
The Constitutional Court’s review of norms is carried out within the scope and limits set in Article 148. While regulating the binding force of decisions, Article 153 also places a limit on the Court’s creating, by way of annulment, a new rule in the manner of a legislator. Legislative authority and constitutional review therefore cannot be treated, in the law in force, as mutually exclusive claims. [22]
The Difference Between Review of Norms and Individual Application
Review of norms concerns the constitutionality of a regulation. Individual application, by contrast, is directed at the claim that rights within the common protection area of the Constitution, the European Convention on Human Rights and the additional protocols to which Türkiye is a party have been violated by public authority, within the statutory conditions. Under Article 45 of Law No. 6216, no individual application may be made directly against legislative acts. Article 50 regulates the remedying of the violation and its consequences where a violation is found; this route is not a general application for the annulment of a statute. [23]
Institutional Criticism and the Law in Force
The conclusion that follows from these provisions is clear: Waldron’s approach cannot be used as a legal basis for rejecting the binding force of Constitutional Court decisions in Türkiye. [22] The philosophical debate asks how powers should be designed; the law in force determines the conditions for exercising the existing power.
When this distinction is maintained, the debate becomes productive for legal practice. The quality of lawmaking processes, the reasons given in judicial decisions, the hearing of dissenting opinions and the remedying of rights violations can be assessed together. Debating the legitimacy of institutions does not remove the responsibility to perform the duties entrusted to them.
The Importance of a Culture of Disagreement for Lawyers
Engaging the Opposing View at Its Strongest
The first lesson that can be drawn from this debate for professional work is to examine the opposing view without simplifying it. Answering only the weak part of an argument may leave the real objection unanswered. It matters as much for a lawyer to show the strengths of their own view as to explain which of the other side’s reasons cannot be accepted and why.
In a case file, the same fact may be given different legal meanings. Sound work should separate the dispute over the fact from the dispute over the interpretation of the legal rule. In this way it becomes clear whether the debate will proceed through evidence, through conceptual explanation, or through establishing the relationship among norms.
Reasoning Is the Way a Decision Is Held Accountable
The value of a statement of reasons cannot be sought merely in its containing sentences that support the decision. The objection that may have affected the decision must be assessed, the link between evidence and outcome must be explained, and it must be shown why the chosen interpretation was preferred. What is emphasized here is a professional and institutional criterion for assessing the giving of reasons.
When the addressee of a decision can understand why their claim was not accepted, they have a clearer basis for criticizing the decision or turning to legal remedies. In this respect, the statement of reasons makes visible the relationship between the authority of the deciding institution and the voice of the person who bears the burden of the decision.
Preserving a Place for Objection After the Decision
Legal certainty requires decisions that can be implemented. On the other hand, a legal order that learns must be able to benefit from the reasoning and the criticism of decisions. The conclusion of a dispute and the questions it has raised losing their intellectual value are not the same thing.
For this reason, a lawyer’s task is, besides reporting the result of a decision, to be able to set out its basis, its limits and the questions it leaves open. The capacity to live together is related less to the necessary ending of different views than to the procedures within which they can meet.
Conclusion: The Authority of the Common Decision and Equal Citizenship
Thinking about Law and Disagreement requires taking the responsibility of deciding seriously alongside the search for justice. We can hold strong convictions about rights; at the same time, we can recognize the equal place in society of those who do not share those convictions.
According to the assessment defended in this article, the basic criterion for a healthy legal order is what happens to the person who ends up on the other side of the decision. Can the person make their reasons heard? Do the avenues through which they can defend their rights work? Can institutions recognize and correct their errors? A common decision should be assessed together with the answers to these questions.
The claim of law to justice grows stronger to the extent that, even where disagreement persists, it can provide people with an equal voice and effective guarantees of rights. The contribution of the debate Waldron opened to legal culture is that it can place this responsibility ahead of both democratic decision processes and judicial authority.
Frequently Asked Questions
What Is the Book Law and Disagreement About?
The work examines how the shared decisions of citizens who cannot agree about rights and justice can be made legitimate, and the place of legislation, participation and judicial review in this relationship. [1]
Does Waldron Deny the Importance of Rights?
This interpretation is not accurate. Commitment to rights and adopting a particular institutional order for protecting rights are different matters. Waldron’s discussion is based on this distinction. [5]
Is a Majority Decision Always Correct?
A decision’s receiving more support does not by itself prove it is correct. The fairness of the decision procedure, the strength of the reasons and the effect of the decision on rights must be assessed separately.
Does Disagreement over Rights Mean Relativism?
Accepting that disagreement exists does not require accepting that all views are equally true. The search for truth and the justification of binding decision-making authority are separate questions. [6]
Why Does This Debate Matter for Legal Practice?
The debate encourages understanding the opposing view correctly, explaining the basis of authority, making visible the reasons that influence the decision, and assessing guarantees of rights together with how institutions work.
Does the Book Examine Only Judicial Review?
The work consists of three main parts: the legal philosophy of legislation, disagreement of principle, and rights and judicial review. Legislation through an assembly, statutory interpretation and the right of participation are also important parts of the review. [1]
Are There Academic Studies on the Book?
Richard A. Posner, David Estlund and Thomas Christiano have published assessments directly on the book. Melissa Schwartzberg has also examined the work for its place within democratic theory. The bibliographic records of these studies are starting points for readers who wish to continue a critical reading. [19] [18] [24] [20]
Is Waldron Discussed in Turkish Academic Work?
Hüseyin Günal’s article on normative legal positivism addresses Waldron’s conception of democratic law in a separate section. Atıl Buğra Karadaş’s study on constitutionalism and democracy also draws on the book’s theses. These publications are not a chapter-by-chapter summary of the Turkish edition of the work; they are research that develops the relevant ideas. [25] [26]
Sources
Source check date: October 27, 2026
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford University Press, 1999. Book record and publisher’s summary. Open source
- Alexander Latham-Gambi, Jeremy Waldron and the Circumstances of Politics, The Review of Politics, vol. 83, no. 2, 2021, pp. 242–263. Published abstract. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Hukuk ve Anlaşmazlık (Turkish edition of Law and Disagreement), trans. Emrah Denizhan, Fol Kitap, October 2026. Turkish edition details. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Introduction. The publisher’s chapter summary and the publicly available sample chapter of the Turkish edition. Publisher record · Open text
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 10, Between Rights and Bills of Rights, pp. 211–231. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 8, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, pp. 164–187. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 7, Rawls’s Political Liberalism, pp. 149–163. The publisher’s chapter summary and chapter outline. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 9, The Circumstances of Integrity, pp. 188–208. The publisher’s chapter summary. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 13, The Constitutional Conception of Democracy, pp. 282–312. The publisher’s chapter summary. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 11, Participation The Right of Rights, pp. 232–254. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 5, Legislation Authority and Voting, pp. 88–118. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 3, Legislation by Assembly, pp. 49–68. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 4, Text and Polyphony, pp. 69–87. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 6, Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation, pp. 119–146. The publisher’s chapter summary. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, Yale Law Journal, vol. 115, 2006, pp. 1346–1406; distinction between kinds of review pp. 1353–1356, assumptions p. 1360. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Judges as Moral Reasoners, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 7, no. 1, 2009, pp. 2–24. Open source
- Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, chapter 12, Disagreement and Precommitment, pp. 255–281. Open source
- David Estlund, Jeremy Waldron on Law and Disagreement, Philosophical Studies, vol. 99, 2000, pp. 111–128; especially pp. 111–115. Publisher record and open text. Publisher record · Open text
- Richard A. Posner, Book Review (reviewing Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999)), Columbia Law Review, vol. 100, 2000, p. 582 ff. Published abstract from the University of Chicago archive. Open source
- Melissa Schwartzberg, Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Jacob T. Levy (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Classics in Contemporary Political Theory, August 10, 2017. The publisher’s chapter summary. Open source
- Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, Harvard Law Review, vol. 121, 2008, p. 1693 ff. Open source
- Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye, in particular Arts. 2, 6, 7, 11, 13, 148 and 153. Official legislation page of the Constitutional Court. Open source
- Law No. 6216 on the Establishment and Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court, in particular Arts. 45 and 50. Open source
- Thomas Christiano, Waldron on Law and Disagreement, Law and Philosophy, vol. 19, no. 4, 2000, pp. 513–543. Bibliographic record of the University of Arizona. Open source
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