Freedom of religion also protects a religious community's internal organization and the determination of its spiritual leader. Public authorities cannot impose their preferred management model without limit on the ground that there is disagreement within the community. The legal basis of an interference, its concrete need, its duration and its effect on the participation of community members must be explained.
The Constitutional Court's (AYM) decision in Levon Berç Kuzukoğlu and Ohannes Garbis Balmumciyan [Plenary Assembly], Application No. 2014/17354, May 22, 2019 examined the rejection of requests concerning the election of the Patriarchate of the Armenians of Türkiye. By majority vote, the Court found a violation of freedom of religion. The decision is not a regulation that alone determines the election method of every religious institution today. It is case law that shows the constitutional limits of public interference.
Why does freedom of religion also cover the organization of a community?
The guarantee in Article 24 of the Constitution is not limited to a person's inner belief or individual worship. Living a belief together, carrying out religious life and the community order needed for this are also important. The determination of a religious leader may form part of a community's belief practice and continuity. The general framework of freedom of religion and conscience is explained in the article freedom of religion and conscience, and the disclosure of belief and the prohibition of discrimination in the article disclosure of belief and the prohibition of discrimination in freedom of religion and conscience.
The AYM examined in this application the link between the election of the patriarch and freedom of religion. It held that the leader's role within the community cannot be treated merely as an administrative office. The request for an election was therefore not reduced to an ordinary internal appointment matter unrelated to belief. The protected interest is the ability of community members to take part in religious life, and the conduct of internal organization free from arbitrary interference. For the general scope of freedom of association, see the article freedom of association.
Direct quotation from the decision
"Freedom of religion also includes the organization of religious communities free from arbitrary interference by the State."
Where the quotation appears: AYM, Levon Berç Kuzukoğlu and Ohannes Garbis Balmumciyan [Plenary Assembly], Application No. 2014/17354, May 22, 2019, § 95. This sentence appears in the majority's reasoning.
Legal characterization: That the dispute concerns organization does not mean that the judgment must be based on Article 33 of the Constitution. In this decision, the organization of the religious community was assessed within freedom of religion under Article 24 of the Constitution. The fact that the title of the decision refers to organization should not be confused with the right that the operative part found to be violated.
How did the dispute over the election of the patriarch arise?
The patriarch in office at the time could not perform his duties because of health problems. Two different solutions emerged within the community. In the application of the spiritual faction, the election of a co-patriarch was proposed. A civil initiative, in which the applicants also took part, requested the election of a new patriarch. The public authorities rejected both requests and adopted a solution that made it possible to appoint a patriarchal deputy (patrik genel vekili).
The applicants challenged the rejection of their election request before the administrative courts. The dispute addressed the historical statute (nizamname), the election regulations, the circumstances in which the patriarchal office is considered vacant, and how the wishes of the civil members would be represented. The AYM considered these matters in terms of the justification for the interference with freedom of religion.
The facts of the decision concern a specific election process in the past. The persons, offices and temporary arrangements described in the decision should not be presented as if they continued today. Accurately describing the historical event and explaining the current institutional position require different research. The focus of this article is the constitutional criteria of the decision.
What exactly is the AYM's ruling?
The AYM's ruling: The complaint concerning freedom of religion was found admissible, and the Court ruled by majority vote that Article 24 of the Constitution had been violated. The applicants were ordered to be jointly paid litigation costs, and a copy of the decision was ordered to be sent to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice.
The applicants sought only a finding of violation (§ 134). The operative part does not contain a non-pecuniary compensation award, a direct appointment of a specific person as patriarch, or an election timetable set by the AYM. Payment of litigation costs does not mean that compensation was awarded. When describing the outcome, results that are not in the operative part should not be added.
How was the review of legality and legitimate aim carried out?
The AYM stressed that a power to restrict a fundamental right must have an accessible, foreseeable legal basis that can prevent arbitrary acts by public authorities. The majority concluded that there was no statutory provision capable of serving as the basis for the specific interference (§ 80). It did not end the review at that point, however, and also assessed the requirements of a democratic social order (§ 81).
This method matters. It cannot be said that the decision is a general annulment of every provision in the historical documents for every purpose. The question in an individual application is whether the particular interference is constitutionally justified. Debates about the nature of the statutes and instructions should be read in the context of the concrete case and of the different reasoning in the dissenting opinions.
The AYM accepted as a legitimate aim the concern to fill the gap in the functioning of the patriarchate and to protect the rights of community members (§§ 85–86). However, this aim did not by itself prove that the chosen solution was necessary. A legitimate aim does not permit the use of any means that excludes the will of the community.
Does the State's neutrality consist only of non-interference?
Avoiding arbitrary interference and protecting rights
Alongside the duty of the State not to interfere arbitrarily with freedom of religion, there is a responsibility to take appropriate measures to protect the rights of different groups. In disputes within the same faith, neutrality does not mean that the State uses public power to decide which religious interpretation is more correct. When resolving the legal problem, the State should not put its own value judgment in place of the assessment of the members of the faith. The criteria for equality are discussed in the article equality principle and the prohibition of discrimination.
Paragraphs 103–105 of the decision explain that public authorities must act carefully when faced with different interpretations of how a belief should be practiced. Judicial review is possible, but its subject is not to determine which group understands the belief more accurately. The effect of the interference on the right, its basis and its reasoning must be examined.
Why might dialogue be a less intrusive solution?
The AYM stated that the State may make efforts to reconcile the interests of different groups within a community. In this case, however, it found that the possibility of resolving the matter through dialogue had not been explored. It criticized the fact that, instead of seeking a solution with the participation of community leaders, clergy and other social groups, the administration imposed its own proposal (§§ 125–126).
Our assessment: Neutrality does not mean that a public authority must necessarily remain silent. The essential question is whether the interference preserves the community's ability to make decisions peacefully. Procedural safeguards that ensure participation and a measure that imposes a specific management outcome do not carry the same weight. A long-term management arrangement must be justified separately, after less restrictive options have been considered.
Why did the duration and the representation of the community's will matter?
The decision specifically considered that the patriarch could not be elected in line with the will of the community for more than ten years (§ 119). This period shows that the effect of a measure first thought to be temporary may become more serious over time. Calling a measure temporary does not make it unnecessary to examine how long it lasted and how it will end.
The AYM also dwelt on the prioritization of the spiritual faction's will and the exclusion of the civil faction from the election and management processes (§§ 121–127). The examination did not focus only on whether an office remained vacant. It also considered the balance of representation within the community and the participation of its members. In this way, the concrete effect of the management problem on the religious life of individuals became visible.
| Assessment area | Question to ask |
|---|---|
| Legal basis | Which rule supports the public authority's power to determine or block the election process? |
| Community will | Who takes part in the decision, and which members or groups are excluded? |
| Necessity | Has a concrete social need that makes the interference necessary been shown? |
| Alternatives and duration | Have dialogue and lighter solutions been examined, and how long will the temporary arrangement last? |
The table summarizes the review points drawn from the decision. A current institution does not determine by itself the voting, candidacy, representation or meeting rules. In particular, the election of a religious leader and the election of a foundation's board of directors may be different legal acts. The institution's legal status and the applicable rules must be examined separately.
How should the dissenting opinions be distinguished from the majority judgment?
Four members of the Court did not agree with the finding of violation. In the dissenting opinions, the legal status of the historical regulations and the nature of the temporary solution the administration developed between two different requests are assessed differently. Some different grounds relate to how the review of legality should be structured. These views help in understanding the contested aspects of the decision.
However, a statement in a dissenting opinion should not be presented as if it were the ruling the majority adopted. The majority concluded that the interference blocking a new patriarch election could not be justified by a pressing social need (§§ 130–132). The concluding sentence of the decision is that freedom of religion was violated; that this was decided by majority vote does not change that result.
How should an application be made in a similar dispute?
The election request, the administration's response, institutional decisions, applicable regulations and documents showing participation should be arranged in chronological order. It should be explained which current and personal right of the applicant is affected by the interference. Stating only the general interest of the community does not in every case satisfy the requirement of victim status, which is a condition for an individual application. Victim status and the other admissibility conditions are explained in detail in the article admissibility conditions for individual applications to the Constitutional Court.
The ordinary remedies for review of the administrative act should be assessed. In this process, it is important to document proposals for a solution, requests for dialogue and the answers given. For an individual application to the AYM, the conditions in Articles 45–47 of Law No. 6216, the exhaustion of ordinary effective remedies and the general thirty-day period are considered together. The outcome of a historical election dispute does not automatically change the time limits for a new act.
Conclusion
An interference with the right of religious communities to determine their own leaders requires a concrete and strong constitutional justification. In the decision examined, the lack of a legal basis, the long duration, the exclusion of civil participation and the failure to explore dialogue all operated together. The State's neutrality requires solutions that allow rights to be exercised peacefully, rather than determining how a community practices its faith. For other decisions on qualified rights, see the article qualified rights in Constitutional Court decisions; for the freedom of expression of military personnel, see the article freedom of expression of soldiers.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is the election of a religious leader only an internal institutional matter?
It is not always only an administrative matter. Because of the leader's role in the religious life of the community, a direct link to freedom of religion can be established. In this application, the AYM examined the dispute within the scope of Article 24 of the Constitution.
Can the State never intervene in a dispute within a community?
There is no such absolute result. Lawful and necessary measures that protect rights may be considered. However, where the administration imposes its own solution and does not explore lighter alternatives, a constitutional problem may arise.
Did the AYM appoint a specific person as patriarch?
No. The operative part concerns the finding of a violation of freedom of religion, the payment of litigation costs and the sending of the decision to the relevant ministries. It contains no provision appointing a specific person.
Does this decision set all the election rules for community foundations?
No. The election of a religious leader and the election of a foundation's management body should not be treated as the same. The institution's legal status, the type of act and the applicable regulations must be examined separately.
Can a view in a dissenting opinion be presented as the AYM's decision?
A dissenting opinion may be presented as such, identified as a separate view. It cannot replace the majority's operative part. In this case, the majority found that freedom of religion had been violated.
Sources and legal bases
- AYM, Levon Berç Kuzukoğlu and Ohannes Garbis Balmumciyan [Plenary Assembly], Application No. 2014/17354, May 22, 2019, §§ 53–81, 85–107, 109–136, operative part and reasons of the dissenting opinions. Full text access may require a login.
- Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye, Articles 2, 13 and 24.
- Law No. 6216 on the Establishment and Trial Procedures of the Constitutional Court, Articles 45–50.
- AYM, Fundamental Rights: Summaries of Decisions, June 2025, printed pp. 125–126.