Trust in the lawyer is built on a different footing from most professional relationships. A client sometimes shares with a lawyer an event they have not yet told their family, a piece of information that could affect their reputation, or a document they fear may be evaluated against them. In return, they expect not only a legal answer but also that what they have said will be protected, taken seriously and not used against them.
The difficulty of this relationship lies in the fact that trust carries two different needs at once. The client wants to be understood; the lawyer must test what has been said in legal terms. The client wants support; the lawyer sometimes has to oppose certain demands. The client wants to be free of uncertainty; the lawyer must honestly disclose what is still unknown. A sound lawyer–client relationship is built not by ignoring these tensions, but by managing them openly within a professional framework.
For this reason, it is not enough to explain trust by good faith, a warm manner or frequent phone calls. Trust means that the tasks, the information, the decisions and the limits are understandable. This is where the ethics of the profession takes concrete form: not in the client becoming dependent on a person to whom they have handed themselves over, but in the client being able to decide with an understanding of their legal position.
Professional ethics moves from knowing the rules to acting correctly in a concrete situation
It is easy to say that a lawyer must keep secrets, protect their independence and work diligently. The real question arises when these obligations pull in different directions in the same matter. What should be done if the explanation the client wants includes confidential information about third parties? How should a demand that seems emotionally justified but has no legal basis be explained? How should the relationship continue if the interests of two clients, initially aligned, later diverge?
Kürşad Demirbaş's study Legal Practice in the Context of Professional Ethics (Meslek Etiği Bağlamında Avukatlık) stands out for questioning the relationship between the purpose of the profession and everyday practice. This thinking reminds us that ethics training cannot be completed by memorising prohibitions alone. Ethical evaluation, however, cannot be read as a freedom that replaces personal conscience with the professional rules in force. Legal obligations and professional rules remain binding; ethical reasoning deepens our understanding of why and how they should be protected in a concrete situation. [4]
Article 34 of the Attorneyship Law (Avukatlık Kanunu), which sets out the duties of diligence, honesty and dignity, is in this respect a framework of conduct. Being kind to a client while not disclosing a significant risk; promising confidentiality while uploading the file to an uncontrolled digital environment; speaking of loyalty while ignoring a conflict of interest: each of these shows a gap between ethical concepts and practice. [1]
The approach I defend in this article is that ethical quality should not be judged only by the explanation given after a crisis. Proper acceptance of a matter, clear engagement and regular information matter well before the tensions that may arise later.
The dispute the client describes may not be the whole of the loss they feel
The monetary value of a case and the meaning it holds for a person are not the same. A small-looking debt may be linked to the recognition of someone's work; a commercial dispute may be linked to the erosion of trust built up over years; a criminal accusation may be linked to a person's need to explain themselves before their family and community. If the lawyer speaks only about the amount that can be claimed or the penalty for the offence, they may not grasp the client's real concern.
Fahrettin Kayhan's study on transference and countertransference in the lawyer–client interaction is important for making visible the emotional weight that a legal dispute carries into the relationship. Kayhan discusses how a dispute that appears technical may carry a very different meaning for the person, and how that meaning can shape communication. [3, p. 253–256]
The professional lesson to be drawn from this is that the lawyer is not responsible for analysing the client's whole life. The task is to understand which need legal assistance can answer and which expectation it cannot. The gap between the outcome the court can provide and the moral recognition the client hopes for should be discussed at the right time.
A decision may be favourable in law without making good the whole of the loss a client has suffered. Seeing this does not diminish the value of a legal success. It allows the lawyer to give the client a more honest account of what the law can and cannot do. The trustworthy side of a lawyer is not that they promise to heal every wound, but that they can explain the area in which they take responsibility.
Transference and countertransference must not be used to label the client
In Kayhan's work, transference is considered as the carrying over into the lawyer relationship of certain emotional expectations and reactions formed in earlier important relationships. Countertransference, on the other hand, leads us to consider how the lawyer's emotional reactions arising within the relationship may affect the legal assistance provided. These are concepts of psychodynamic explanation used in the article; they are not tools that allow a lawyer to make a clinical diagnosis of a client. [3, p. 250–253]
A client who calls often, speaks angrily or says they do not trust their lawyer cannot by itself be proof of such an interpretation. Information may genuinely not have been given, a step may not have been explained, or the agreed communication arrangements may not have been followed. The concrete circumstances of the relationship must be examined first. Attributing every criticism to the client's psychology prevents the lawyer from evaluating their own service.
This is the point where the source deserves critical reading today. Linking certain behaviours to broad psychological explanations should not be used as a definitive classification applicable to all clients. The same behaviour may have different causes. In a legal relationship, the appropriate approach is to describe the problem observed and to produce a professional solution.
Recognising one's own feelings as a lawyer protects legal judgment
A lawyer who feels a strong closeness to a client may find it hard to examine the client's account critically. A lawyer who feels constantly criticised may also perceive a legitimate request as an attack. Turning a case into a personal test of success may create unnecessary resistance to a settlement option or to a change of strategy. These are not situations that arise in every relationship, but they are risks to watch for in professional self-assessment.
An important question the lawyer can ask themselves is this: "Is the step I am proposing based on the client's legal need, or on the anger, anxiety or desire to prove myself that I feel about this matter?" This question is not a solution in itself; but it helps to rebuild the legal reasoning.
Seeking a colleague's opinion, looking at the file with fresh eyes and assessing the workload can be useful at this point. However, consulting a colleague must also take place within the limits of confidentiality. Seeking support does not justify disclosing the client's identity or file to unnecessary people.
Empathy does not require adopting every view of the client
Understanding the anger a client feels is one thing; agreeing with every assessment they make of the other side is another. Legal assistance is useful to the extent that it preserves this distinction. The lawyer can understand why the client has been hurt and still explain that the claim put forward is not supported by evidence.
Excessive identification may lead a lawyer to see the opposing party only as an enemy, or to regard a reasonable settlement as a moral defeat. The approach of the Professional Rules of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (Türkiye Barolar Birliği Meslek Kuralları), Article 6, which keeps hostility between the parties outside the lawyer's role, is not a demand for detachment. It is the protection of the independent space of assessment that allows the lawyer to be useful to the client. [2]
It is not the lawyer's task to provide therapy. An assessment of mental health or a situation requiring treatment falls within the field of competent specialists. While keeping within the boundaries of their own role, the lawyer can work on the clarity, time and suitable communication conditions that will make it easier for the person to take part in legal proceedings.
The difference between loyalty and obedience appears in difficult requests
Loyalty to a client means safeguarding their legally protectable interests. This loyalty does not oblige the lawyer to prepare an unlawful document, to influence a witness, to make a false statement or to intimidate the other side. That a demand comes from the client does not make the method compatible with the profession.
Independence, on the other hand, does not mean that the lawyer decides the course of the client's life. The client's aim, the lawyer's legal assessment and the authority required for the transaction must be considered together. Choices whose economic or personal consequences fall on the client should not be made on their behalf without the consequences being clearly explained. Refusing an unlawful demand, however, is a different responsibility.
For the relationship to work well, the reasoning behind a recommendation must be visible. Why is a particular course being recommended? What is the risk of the other route? Can the choice change if new information emerges? A client's approval of a decision is meaningful only when they have enough information about what the decision is and about its main consequences.
One of the harder forms of professional courage for a lawyer is not to give false reassurance, even at the risk of losing the relationship. The answer the client wishes to hear and the opinion the file supports may not be the same. Maintaining trust depends on this difference being discussed respectfully but openly.
The duty to protect the client's aim and right of decision is central to the discussion of the cost of seeking justice and the ethics of defence.
A guarantee of outcome does not resolve uncertainty; it hides it from the client
The outcome of a case is not something the lawyer can determine alone. Evaluation of the evidence, the defence of the other side, the interpretation of the court and developments during the process may all affect the result. Article 34 of the Professional Rules provides that a lawyer may give a legal opinion but must specifically state that it is not a guarantee. [2]
Against this, leaving the whole assessment at "nothing is ever certain" is also not enough. A legal opinion should classify uncertainty. Which aspects are strong on the basis of the existing document, which information still needs to be completed, which interpretations are disputed and which developments are beyond control can each be explained separately.
What the client needs is often not a mathematical percentage of winning. It is knowing which risk exists, why it exists and what can be done to reduce it. A probability ratio with no basis creates an impression of certainty without necessarily improving the quality of the decision. By contrast, explaining the assumptions on which an opinion rests makes it understandable why it changes when new information arrives.
A lawyer cannot guarantee the result; they can explain the scope, diligence and communication of the work they undertake. Commitments that the client can follow should be established in this area too.
For a concrete assessment of the quality of the work, the professional criteria that can be examined when choosing a lawyer also start from this distinction.
Confidentiality is a precondition for legal assistance to begin
If a client cannot disclose to their lawyer information that could be interpreted against them, the defence and advice are built on incomplete information. Professional secrecy is therefore not merely a courtesy rule between two people; it is the guarantee that the person can obtain legal assistance.
Article 36 of the Attorneyship Law regulates the basic obligation not to disclose information learned in the course of the lawyer's duties and related activities. Article 37 of the Professional Rules addresses information learned from a person whose request for representation was not accepted and emphasises the continuing nature of the obligation. Accordingly, the statement "no power of attorney has been given yet" or "my client is no longer my client" does not mean that the information learned may be used freely. [1] [2]
Confidentiality and the right to refuse to testify are two sides of the same question
Articles 46 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) and 36 of the Attorneyship Law provide special safeguards in respect of testimony based on professional knowledge. The effect of the client's consent on testimony and the lawyer's right to refuse should be considered together. The Attorneyship Law provides that a lawyer may refuse to testify even where consent has been given. This structure cannot be read as meaning that all secrets can be disclosed without limit on the strength of a single signature. [1] [5]
Testimony, sharing of a file, public disclosure and transfer of data to another service provider are not the same operation. Each must be examined within its own purpose, scope and legal conditions. A client's request for a disclosure does not by itself remove other legal limits, such as data belonging to third parties or the confidentiality of an investigation.
Confidentiality must cover the whole information flow of the office
Confidentiality is not ensured merely by the lawyer keeping quiet. A wrong email recipient, an authority to share that is wider than necessary, a file left open, an uncontrolled group chat or access to a document by a person who should not have it can all expose information that must be protected. The Professional Rules also emphasise measures to prevent the lawyer's assistants and employees from breaching the duty of professional secrecy. [2]
For this reason, access to information should be tied to the task. Not every detail in a document is necessarily needed by everyone who processes it. Delivery, copying, sharing and storage of a file should be considered not as separate operations but as stages of the same responsibility.
The right question for the client's trust is not limited to "Is a digital tool being used?" Which information, for what purpose, and to whom is it being opened up; how is that access being limited? Use of technology should also be assessed within the lawyer's professional diligence.
When family pays the fee, who may be informed about the case?
Consider, for example, an adult client whose lawyer's fee is paid by their sibling, and the sibling then asks for meeting notes, evidence and all correspondence. In this hypothetical situation, three roles must be kept separate: the person receiving legal assistance, the person paying, and the person authorised to receive information. These need not be the same person.
Paying the fee or being a family member does not in itself give the right to learn the entire content of the file. Before any sharing, it must be determined whom the client has authorised, for which information and through which communication channel. Whether there is legal representation or another specific legal basis must be examined separately. Issuing a document relating to payment and disclosing the content of the defence are different acts. This distinction is the consequence of applying the duty of professional secrecy to the concrete case. [1, Art. 36] [2, Art. 37]
Setting limits on the lawyer's side is not intended to exclude the family. It ensures that the client retains control over their own information while receiving legal assistance. A sharing arrangement left vague at the outset, out of a wish to help the family, can become a serious trust problem if a family dispute arises later. For this reason, clarifying at the outset who the information will be shared with and the scope of the sharing, and recording this with written confirmation, is a sound working method.
Artificial intelligence does not take over the lawyer's duty of verification and confidentiality
Generative artificial intelligence can help with drafting a text, developing questions or reviewing the language of a document. But uploading a legal file to a tool and using the answer the tool produces are two separate matters of review. The first raises questions of confidentiality and data processing; the second raises questions of accuracy and legal assessment.
The document of the Personal Data Protection Authority (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurumu) on the use of generative artificial intelligence in workplaces draws attention in particular to the risks of publicly available tools provided by third parties, which must be managed at an institutional level. This framework should be considered together with the duty of professional secrecy in the context of the legal profession. [6]
Removing a person's name from a file does not make it anonymous in every case. The characteristics of the event, the place, the date, the profession or other information may allow the person to be re-identified. Relying solely on the statement "we deleted the names" without evaluating the purposes for which the provider uses the data, where it is stored and who can access it is not sufficient. Personal data and transfer conditions must be examined separately.
As for the output, a text that appears fluent and coherent is not enough. Whether a decision actually exists, the accuracy of a quotation, the current form of a statutory provision and the link between the opinion and the concrete facts must be checked against the primary source. Signing a text produced by a tool does not mean leaving the accuracy of the text to the tool.
For this reason, the essential professional question about technology is not speed. It is this: does the tool make the review more verifiable, or does it make a review that has not yet been carried out appear to have been done? The lawyer's responsibility begins at this distinction.
Conflicts of interest must be considered before an open opposition appears
Two people describing the same event in similar terms at the outset does not show that their interests will remain the same throughout the process. One person's defence may increase the other's liability; persons acting together may come to differ in their views on damage, fault or payment.
Article 38 of the Attorneyship Law and Articles 35–36 of the Professional Rules set out the basic restrictions in this area. In criminal procedure, Article 152 of the CMK also regulates the defence of several suspects or accused persons by the same defence counsel on condition that their interests are compatible. Working within a shared office does not neutralise the conflict limits in the professional rules. [1] [2] [5]
Conflict checking should not be reduced to the single question "Have I previously acted for the other side?" Information received earlier on the same dispute, the scope of the work and the connection between the new engagement and that information must be examined. Conversely, the fact that a person was once given some service on an unrelated matter does not place every future matter automatically in the same category; the concrete connection must be assessed.
Where a conflict falls within the prohibited scope, the parties' statement that "we see no problem" is not sufficient on its own. The client's consent is not a general authority that overrides every professional rule. When a conflict is discovered later, the lawyer must, while continuing to protect confidentiality, assess under the professional rules both the matter in question and the procedure for withdrawal.
When one person's statement turns against another in a joint defence
Consider two people who initially shared the same account of events, and who take different positions after a new document comes to light. If one says "I did not carry out the transaction, the other did", the effect of each defence on the other now needs to be examined. Belonging to the same family, applying together or the fee being paid by one person does not make this examination unnecessary.
Here the lawyer's task is not to reconcile the two accounts in a single shared sentence. It is to determine whether each person's defence harms the other, what problem arises if information already learned is used in the new defence, and whether the representation can continue within the professional rules. Where a conflict of interest within the prohibited scope arises, it cannot be assumed that the representation may continue on a general consent from the parties. [1, Art. 38] [2, Art. 35–37] [5, Art. 152]
If the engagement must be ended, notice, imminent steps and the protection of a person's defence are handled under the applicable procedure. Ceasing to represent one person does not give freedom to use a secret learned from them for the benefit of another. Spotting a conflict early is part of the professional diligence that prevents a loyalty problem which cannot be repaired later.
The quality of communication is measured by how useful the information is, not by the number of meetings
Telling a client that "the hearing has been postponed" is reporting a development. Explaining the reason for the postponement, what will be done in the meantime, which document is expected from the client and how the new date affects the process is legal information. The professional value of communication lies in this second dimension.
A file in which nothing happens every day does not necessarily require the same explanation every day. However, if the communication arrangements are unclear, silence may be perceived as neglect. Who will inform the client of which development, how they can be reached in an urgent situation and through which channel routine questions will be handled should be discussed from the outset. This arrangement is established not to reduce personal closeness, but to make expectations predictable.
When the news is bad, information must not be delayed either. When the explanation of the legal consequence and the lawyer's defence of their own work are squeezed into the same conversation, the client's need can be pushed into the background. First, what has happened, what it means and which options are available should be explained. Where there has been a professional error, it must not be covered up with untrue explanations.
Written confirmation should not be reduced to a protective tool against the client
Article 53 of the Attorneyship Law regulates the recording in minutes of such meeting matters as are considered necessary. A meeting note can help ensure that important facts and decisions are correctly remembered at a later stage. It does not follow from this that every meeting must be recorded by audio or video; the legal conditions for such recordings are assessed separately. [1]
The purpose of written confirmation should not be to obtain from the client a general disclaimer of responsibility full of legal terms. What information has been shared, which document is missing, what has been agreed and who will take the next step should be clear. The client's confirmation of the facts does not remove the lawyer's responsibility for the legal assessment.
Clarity on fees and scope of work is not a commercial detail outside trust
When a legal relationship is being established, postponing the discussion of fees is sometimes seen as courtesy. However, uncertainty that emerges later can affect the whole of the professional work. The matter to which the fee relates, how expenses will be paid, the scope of the different stages and the payment arrangement should be clearly determined.
Articles 163–164 of the Attorneyship Law regulate the basic framework of the lawyer's engagement contract and fees. The absence of a written contract does not mean in every case that there is no contract or that the fee is automatically only the tariff amount; the law contemplates different situations in determining the fee. For this reason, written clarity is not merely a formality; it makes visible what the relationship is based on. [1]
A lawyer's fee, litigation costs and the costs award payable by the other side are not the same item. So that the client can understand their possible total financial burden, these should be explained without being confused. An account of advances, of expenses incurred and of money received on the client's behalf also forms part of the trust dimension of the relationship. [2, Art. 42–43]
That a service is paid for does not diminish its professional value; and discussing economic conditions does not turn the practice of law into a commercial guarantee of results. The problem arises when the fee is separated from the scope of the work, or when the client's uncertainty is turned into a means of generating income.
Professional obligations continue when the relationship ends
The lawyer–client relationship may end because trust has been lost, because of a dispute over scope or for some other reason. At this stage, anger does not remove the obligations of confidentiality and diligence. The stage the file has reached, imminent steps and the legal obligations relating to the handover should be assessed.
Refusing a matter is not the same as withdrawing from a matter one has accepted. Article 37 of the Attorneyship Law regulates the duty to notify of a refusal of a matter, while Article 41 regulates the continuation of the duty for the period specified in the law after withdrawal from an accepted matter. The special provisions for appointed defence counsel in criminal procedure must also be observed. [1] [5]
The end of the relationship should not be a reason for either party to force the other into making a public statement. A lawyer's legal defence against a claim made against them is not the same as publicly disclosing the secrets of a file. The scope, forum and legal basis of any necessary statement should be assessed separately.
The most serious test of trust sometimes comes not on the days when the relationship is going well, but at the moment it ends. Professional ethics carries a continuity that requires the rights of a person to whom services are no longer provided to be protected.
The true measure of trust is being able to protect the client's rights and decisions
Trust in the lawyer–client relationship begins when a difficult piece of information can be shared without hesitation; it continues through the protection of that information, the clear explanation of options and the diligent implementation of the decisions taken. If no thought has been given at the outset to who pays the fee, who will receive information, or where joint representation may create a problem, good faith alone cannot secure the relationship.
The concrete value of professional ethics appears when the relationship is under strain. Telling a client a risk they do not want to hear, protecting a secret despite the requests of relatives, making a conflict of interest visible and observing the procedure that prevents loss of rights when the engagement ends are different forms of this value. A lawyer cannot use their legal knowledge to increase the client's dependence on them; they must ensure that the client understands what they are deciding.
The professional relationship I endorse combines loyalty, independence and accountability. Standing by the client means watching carefully over their legally protectable interests; it means, where necessary, opposing their demand on reasoned grounds; and it means honestly describing the work done and the matters still open. This openness does not weaken professional authority; it forms the ground on which trust can rest.
The trust a client places in their lawyer should not require them to give up their own decisions. Reliable legal assistance is reached where the person knows both that their information is protected and that they have a say in the legal choices that affect their life.
Sources and Critical Reading Note
- Attorneyship Law No. 1136 (1136 sayılı Avukatlık Kanunu), Art. 34, 36–38, 41, 53, 163–164.
- Professional Rules of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations (Türkiye Barolar Birliği Meslek Kuralları), in particular Art. 2, 6, 34–38 and 42–43.
- Fahrettin Kayhan, “Transference and Countertransference in the Lawyer–Client Interaction” (Avukat–Müvekkil Etkileşiminde Aktarım ve Karşı Aktarım), Journal of the Ankara Bar (Ankara Barosu Dergisi), 2010/4, pp. 249–259; full text. The concepts are used as an approach for thinking about the professional relationship; they are not presented as clinical diagnostic criteria explaining every behaviour.
- Kürşad Demirbaş, Legal Practice in the Context of Professional Ethics (Meslek Etiği Bağlamında Avukatlık), study submitted to the Institute of Social Sciences of Selçuk University, April 2014. As the publication type has not been separately verified, it is not characterised as a peer-reviewed article or a thesis. Historical legal and fee descriptions are not presented as current rules.
- Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (5271 sayılı Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu), Art. 46, 149–156.
- Personal Data Protection Authority (Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurumu), Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools in the Workplace (İş Yerlerinde Üretken Yapay Zekâ Araçlarının Kullanımı), 2026 document. It is considered together with professional secrecy; it is not regarded as a conformity approval for all legal practice.
This article contains general legal information and professional assessment; it does not contain psychological diagnosis or treatment recommendations for individuals. The legal consequences of a specific professional dispute require separate examination of the facts and the applicable provisions.