How long can judicial control last? Under CMK 110/A, the ordinary period for adults is two years in cases that do not fall within the duties of the heavy criminal court, and three years in serious criminal cases. A reasoned extension can bring the overall limits to three and six years respectively. For the offence group specified in the law, the overall limit is seven years. For children, these periods are halved. These upper limits do not mean that the measure may be maintained up to that date in every case.
When calculating the period, the date of the first decision, the nature of the allegation, any valid extension decisions and the time spent on appeal must be examined together. The Constitutional Court (AYM) decision in the Veysel Kuşçu case shows, in particular, that in the case of a travel ban the appeal and cassation stages cannot be excluded from the calculation. Detaining someone for breaching a measure whose maximum period had expired therefore raises a separate question of lawfulness.12
What is judicial control and which obligations does it cover?
Judicial control (adli kontrol) is a protective measure applied during a criminal investigation or prosecution. Under CMK 109, where grounds for pretrial detention exist, it allows a suspect or defendant to be subjected to specific obligations instead of being detained. Judicial control may also be applied where the law prohibits pretrial detention. In every case, the legal basis of the measure, its concrete purpose and its effect on the person's life must be assessed. For a related discussion, the article freedom of expression in judicial control and other protective measures may also be read.
Common examples include being unable to leave the country, reporting regularly to a designated place, not leaving the home, not leaving a particular area of residence and not going to specified places. Obligations such as undergoing treatment, not driving, not carrying a weapon and depositing a security (güvence) are regulated within the same institution. One person may be subject to several obligations; the necessity of each must be explained separately.
Judicial control is not the same institution as the supervised release applied during the enforcement of a conviction. Signing in at a police unit or the use of electronic monitoring does not, on its own, determine which period regime applies. First, the statutory provision and the court decision on which the measure rests must be identified. This article examines the maximum period of judicial control under the CMK.
How long can judicial control last for adults?
The ordinary period and the extension period must be kept apart
CMK 110/A separately regulates the ordinary period and the exceptional option of extension. Reaching the end of the ordinary period does not mean that the extension period starts automatically. An extension requires a necessity and must be justified. The totals below show the highest limits that can be reached where a duly reasoned extension decision exists.1
| Nature of the case | Ordinary period | Maximum extension | Overall upper limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cases outside the duties of the heavy criminal court | 2 years | 1 year | 3 years |
| General offence group within the duties of the heavy criminal court | 3 years | 3 years | 6 years |
| Heavy criminal cases in the specific offence group stated in CMK 110/A/2 | 3 years | 4 years | 7 years |
For example, in a file that is not a heavy criminal case, it is not sufficient to say that "three years have not yet passed." At the end of the two-year ordinary period, the legal basis and the necessity of the extension must be examined. Likewise, the six- or seven-year overall limit does not justify a judicial control order of that length at the outset.
Which offences are subject to the seven-year limit?
The special extension option is provided for offences in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Chapters of the Second Book, Fourth Part of the Turkish Criminal Code, as well as offences falling within the Anti-Terror Law. This provision applies within the structure of CMK 110/A/2 for heavy criminal cases.
Not every heavy criminal file falls into the seven-year group. A general description such as "organised crime" or "collective offence" is not sufficient on its own. The article of the offence charged and whether it falls within the specific group in the law must be determined. The different distinctions in CMK 102 on pretrial detention cannot be transferred into the judicial control provisions as they are.
Where there has been a change in jurisdiction or in the legal characterisation of the offence, the name of the court in which the file was first opened should not be the only reference point. The indictment, decisions on lack of jurisdiction and the final legal characterisation must be considered together. A dispute over the period often concerns which line of the rule applies before any calendar calculation is made.
Maximum judicial control periods for children
CMK 110/A/3 provides that the periods in the same article apply at half the rate for children. The reduction affects not only the overall period but also the ordinary period and the extension limit.
| Nature of the case | Ordinary period | Maximum extension | Overall upper limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cases that are not heavy criminal cases | 1 year | 6 months | 1 year 6 months |
| General heavy criminal offence group | 1 year 6 months | 1 year 6 months | 3 years |
| Specific offence group in CMK 110/A/2 | 1 year 6 months | 2 years | 3 years 6 months |
Applying the adult totals of three, six or seven years to a child's file would directly change the outcome. Age information and the procedural provisions specific to children must be checked against the file. Based on the age-group distinctions in pretrial detention periods, no other ratios should be created for judicial control that do not appear in the law.
Whether the child continues schooling, needs treatment, and the family environment and social development of the child are also particularly important for the proportionality of the measure. Even where the maximum period has not yet expired, concrete effects on education or health may support a request for removal, change or temporary exemption.
From what date does the judicial control period run?
The initial decision and earlier periods are counted
Where judicial control is applied without interruption, the calculation starts from the date on which the measure was first applied. Converting an investigation into a prosecution, sending the file to another court or issuing a new decision to continue the measure does not automatically erase past time. The calculation should not be based solely on the date of the latest decision.
CMK 110/A was introduced by Law No. 7331 and entered into force on 1 January 2022. This date is not a new starting point for all judicial controls that began earlier. In the Veysel Kuşçu decision, the AYM took as its reference the measure that began in 2016 and did not exclude the earlier period from the calculation.2, §§ 38–41
In practice, the initial decision, the document notifying the obligation, the decisions on continuation and extension, the removal decisions and the records of their implementation should be placed side by side. Where there is a discrepancy in dates in particular, no conclusion should be drawn from a single UYAP screenshot. The scope of the decision and the period during which the obligation legally continued should be justified.
Does time spent on appeal and cassation count?
In its decision of 16 December 2025 in the Veysel Kuşçu case, the AYM Plenary included in the maximum period the time during which a travel ban applied to a file pending on appeal. The decision was published in the Official Gazette on 16 April 2026, issue 33226.
The applicant's travel ban began on 21 August 2016. As regards the measure that continued after the first-instance conviction, the seven-year limit expired on 21 August 2023. The AYM emphasised that CMK 110/A does not provide for a separate period calculation between the investigation and the prosecution, or before and after judgment. It did not accept that the assessment of "detention on the basis of conviction" in pretrial detention could be transferred to a travel ban.2 For a separate discussion, the article unlawful pretrial detention and compensation for detention may be consulted.
Şen and Duymaz, in their assessment of the appeal period, also criticise the creation, by interpretation, of a distinction that does not appear in the text of CMK 110/A.5 The citation of this view in an application does not remove the need to document the initial decision and the continuation periods; the legal interpretation and the chronology of events must be presented together.
For example, in a case that is not a heavy criminal case, an uninterrupted travel ban that began on 10 May 2023 would reach the ordinary two-year period on 10 May 2025. If a one-year extension was made in accordance with the legal conditions, the overall upper limit is 10 May 2026. The first-instance conviction and the appeal of the file do not change the starting point in this example. The example assumes that there is no independent measure arising from another file.
Changing the obligation or several offences in one file
Where the obligation to sign is removed and a travel ban continues in the same process, this does not mean that a new full period has been created for the ongoing judicial control. CMK 110/A does not set separate periods to be used again for each change in obligation. An interpretation to the contrary would render the upper limit ineffective by changing the name of the obligation.
The existence of several allegations of offences in one file does not justify multiplying the overall limit by the number of offences. By contrast, independent decisions in different investigations or prosecutions must be examined separately. Removing a ban in one file does not automatically remove the ban in another file.
Intervals in which the measure was actually lifted, temporary exemption decisions and subsequent new decisions are not of the same legal nature. In such cases it cannot be said that the entire calendar interval has been counted, or that the earlier period has been wholly reset, without establishing the chronology of the file. The AYM decision examined concerns an uninterrupted travel ban; it should not be presented as having resolved the calculation for every form of interruption.
Calculating time under house arrest and constitutional review
The obligation not to leave one's home is commonly known as house arrest (ev hapsi). This measure also falls under CMK 109. CMK 110/A contains no provision excluding house arrest from the maximum period rule. Nevertheless, the impact of house arrest on fundamental rights is more severe than that of the obligation to sign or a travel ban.
In its decision in the E. E. case, the AYM assessed the obligation not to leave one's home within the scope of the right to liberty and security. It treated the period after conviction as detention on the basis of conviction for the purposes of constitutional review. This characterisation matters for determining which complaint relates to which period and when the time limit for an individual application begins.3
The E. E. decision does not state that the maximum period in CMK 110/A has been removed, or that remedies under house arrest must necessarily be excluded from the calculation. The Veysel Kuşçu decision concerns a travel ban as the concrete measure. When the two decisions are read together, the assessment of deprivation of constitutional liberty should not be confused with the statutory time limit.
The approach adopted in this article is that no exception absent from the text of CMK 110/A should be created to the detriment of house arrest. However, in a concrete house arrest file, the applications concerning the periods before and after conviction must be assessed separately. It should not be claimed that the decision on a travel ban definitively resolves all types of judicial control within the same scope.
The difference between the four-month review and the maximum period
Four different periods
| Type of period | What it does | Result it does not produce on its own |
|---|---|---|
| Ordinary period | Shows the statutory limit that may be applied without an extension. | Obligation for the measure to continue for this entire period |
| Extension and overall upper limit | Sets the final limit that a reasoned extension can reach. | Automatic extension or cure of a past lack of reasoning |
| Review at least every four months | Checks whether the measure is still necessary. | Start of a new three-, six- or seven-year period |
| Deduction from sentence | Determines the effect of time spent under certain measures on a prison sentence. | Equivalent reduction of the maximum period calculation |
Under CMK 110/4, the continuation of the measure is reviewed by the criminal judgeship of peace (sulh ceza hâkimliği) upon the request of the public prosecutor during the investigation, and by the court during prosecution, ex officio at intervals of no more than four months. This review is not structured as a right dependent on the person filing a petition.
A delay in the four-month review is not the same event as the overall upper limit set by the law being reached. A delay may be the subject of a complaint, but no general conclusion can be drawn that every delay automatically removes all judicial control obligations. The E. E. decision also shows that a delay should be assessed together with the concrete process and the complaint.
Why reasoning and proportionality matter at every stage
The maximum period is not a mandatory waiting period that the State may use in full. The facts relied on in respect of the risk of flight or of interference with evidence may change. The collection of evidence, regular attendance, a fixed residence, employment and family circumstances may affect the assessment. By contrast, concrete preparations to flee or conduct relating to the obligations may be debated as grounds for maintaining the measure.
The defence should not limit itself to saying that the measure has been applied for a long time. It should show which need the measure no longer serves and why a less onerous obligation would be sufficient. The court's assessment should not be confined to the name of the offence or the mere pendency of the case. The necessity that the law requires for an extension must also be demonstrated.
In legal scholarship on house arrest, the time limit is also regarded as a guarantee that prevents indefinite continuation; it is stated that where the measure is no longer needed it should be ended without waiting for the upper limit.6, pp. 163–165
Does judicial control end automatically when the period expires?
The legal limit and administrative records must be assessed separately
The expiry of the statutory maximum period does not leave a legal basis for continuing the same measure beyond that limit. The fact that a court or enforcement unit has not yet updated its system record does not extend the statutory period. However, the limit record, police notifications or supervised release procedures may continue in practice.
For this reason, it is important to request, in a petition that includes the period calculation, removal and notification to the relevant units. The petition should clearly show the initial decision, the extension decisions, the periods of appeal and the calculated end date. Checking, before any concrete step such as foreign travel, that the decision has been recorded in the relevant systems prevents a dispute between the legal position and its implementation.
Treating an obligation as ended on the basis of a personal assessment that the period has expired may lead to a record of violation and a new dispute. Ending the unlawful continuation should be achieved through a duly filed application and by monitoring the implementation of the decision. This does not mean that a measure whose period has expired is legally valid.
Finality, a decision not to prosecute and the end of need
Judicial control does not end only upon the expiry of the maximum period. CMK 103/2 regulates the public prosecutor's power during the investigation where he or she considers the measure unnecessary, and the effect of a decision not to prosecute. Where the conditions for maintaining the measure cease to exist, an assessment of removal is also required.
In its decision of 10 February 2025, E. 2024/9285, K. 2025/2304, the 4th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation (Yargıtay 4. Ceza Dairesi) found that the continuation of a travel ban in a file where the conviction had become final and had moved to the enforcement stage was not lawful. The decision shows that judicial control cannot be treated as an additional sanction that continues automatically throughout enforcement.4
The first-instance conviction and the finality of the judgment are different matters. While the appeal remains open, it cannot be said that all judicial control orders have ended merely because a conviction has been pronounced. Where a limitation arises from a separate file or another legal provision, it must also be examined separately.
Breach of judicial control and pretrial detention
Deliberate breach and any non-compliance are not the same
CMK 112 allows an order for pretrial detention against a person who deliberately fails to comply with an obligation, regardless of the length of the prison sentence provided for. The provision does not make detention mandatory. Whether a breach occurred, the person's intention, statements made and the circumstances of the case must be examined.
For example, a hospital admission related to the obligation to sign, a documented health impediment or a dispute over notification cannot be subjected to the same assessment as deliberately avoiding an obligation. It is important that supporting documents for an excuse are submitted to the file without delay. The idea that an explanation may be given later does not remove the cases in which permission or exemption must be requested in advance.
Can breach of an expired measure justify detention?
The core problem in the Veysel Kuşçu decision was that detention was ordered on the basis of a breach of a travel ban whose maximum period had expired. The AYM majority held that a breach of a measure no longer having a legal basis cannot constitute a ground for detention under CMK 112. In the case under appeal, the reference by the first-instance court to CMK 100 did not resolve this problem.2, §§ 37–43
In the dissent, it was argued that the concrete facts of flight could be assessed under CMK 100 and 101. The majority, however, based its view on the first-instance court's lack of authority at that stage and on the lawfulness of an act relying on a measure whose period had expired. This difference of opinion shows that a petition should discuss not only the end date but also the authority and the facts on which the detention order relied.
The decision does not mean that a person whose maximum judicial control period has expired may never be detained for any reason in any file. A new allegation of offence, an independent decision or a different situation before a competent authority will be assessed separately. The conclusion to be drawn from the decision is that the breach of an expired judicial control order may not be used as a valid basis for detention.
The special position after release due to the detention limit
CMK 109/7 permits judicial control to be applied to persons released because the maximum period of pretrial detention has expired. If, following a deliberate breach of judicial control imposed in this way, detention arises under CMK 112/2, the period may not exceed nine months in heavy criminal cases and two months in other cases.
The nine- and two-month periods are not new judicial control periods added to the limits in CMK 110/A. They are the detention limits for the special breach situation following release due to the detention limit. They cannot be used as a general provision that revives an expired judicial control order.
Removal of judicial control and objection to the decision
To which authority is the request submitted?
Decisions of the judge in the investigation stage and decisions of the court in the prosecution stage are not assessed within the same file structure. The petition should identify the investigation or case number, the current stage and the authority that issued the latest decision. In files at the appeal stage, it should not be assumed that the first-instance court has general authority over every matter.
Under CMK 110 and 111, the removal or change of an obligation, or a temporary exemption for a specific period, may be requested. CMK 111/1 provides that a decision may be given within five days after the public prosecutor's opinion has been obtained, upon the request of the suspect or defendant. The lapse of five days does not mean that the request has been accepted or that the measure has ceased.
CMK 111/2 opens the route of objection to judicial control orders. The objection to decisions of the criminal judgeship of peace on pretrial detention and judicial control is examined, under CMK 268/3-b, by the judge of the relevant criminal court of first instance. For decisions of the criminal courts of first instance and of the heavy criminal courts, and for decisions at the appeal stage, the court structure of CMK 268 applies. The statement that every objection to judicial control goes to "the next criminal judgeship of peace" is not current.
The current objection period is two weeks
The general objection period under CMK 268/1 is two weeks from the date the decision is learned of. This period, changed by Law No. 7499, applies to decisions given on or after 1 June 2024. Older sources referring to seven days should not be used for current decisions.1
An objection is submitted to the authority that issued the decision. If the authority does not find the objection well-founded, it sends it to the authority competent to review it within three days at the latest. Under CMK 269, an objection does not automatically suspend the execution of the decision; where necessary, deferral of execution must be requested separately. For details, the article objection to pretrial detention and request for release may be consulted.
A request for removal and an objection against a specific decision are different. While the measure continues, a removal request based on new facts or on the expiry of a period may be submitted. However, submitting a new petition does not automatically restart a missed objection period against an earlier decision or the period for an individual application.
Which information and documents should the petition contain?
The following documents are important for the application to be reviewable:
- The initial judicial control decision and a clear list of the obligations currently in force.
- The decisions on continuation, extension, change, exemption and removal.
- The indictment, decisions on jurisdiction, the judgment and the records showing the stage of appeal.
- A period schedule showing the periods from the start and the upper limit applied.
- The notification or UYAP record showing the date on which the decision to be objected to was learned of.
- Concrete documents establishing health, educational, employment or family needs.
- An explicit request that the removal be notified to the relevant police, supervised release or border units.
The outcome sought must also be clear. Where the maximum period has expired, removal may be requested; where it has not yet expired, separate grounds may be set out, such as unnecessity, disproportionality, change of obligation or temporary exemption. Alternative requests that are not mutually contradictory make the options that the court will consider more concrete.
Is time spent under judicial control deducted from a sentence?
The general rule under CMK 109/6 is that time spent under judicial control is not deducted from the sentence. The law treats the obligation to undergo treatment under CMK 109/3-e and the obligation not to leave one's home under CMK 109/3-j separately from this general rule. For the obligation not to leave one's home, every two days count as one day for deduction. For more detailed information, the article deduction of time in detention and custody from a sentence may be consulted.
For example, if sixty days were spent under house arrest, a deduction of thirty days from the prison sentence may arise, within the legal conditions. By contrast, the time spent under judicial control for the purposes of CMK 110/A is sixty days. The deduction ratio does not halve the day count in the calculation of the maximum period.
It cannot be said that time spent signing or under a travel ban is deducted from a sentence in the same way as house arrest. The manner in which the obligation to undergo treatment was applied and the deduction calculation should also be examined on the basis of their own records. The period limit, the effect on the enforcement of the sentence and compensation are three separate legal questions.
Unlawful judicial control and remedies
Compensation does not depend on the same conditions for every measure
CMK 141/1-k lists, among the grounds for compensation, the fact that a person was not able to benefit from the ordinary legal remedies against a judicial control order. CMK 141/1-l separately regulates the situation where a decision not to prosecute or an acquittal is given after the obligation not to leave one's home, or the treatment obligation provided for in the law, has been applied. For this topic, the article house arrest and judicial control may also be read.
For this reason, it cannot be said that compensation under CMK 141/1-l arises for every signing obligation or every travel ban merely because the person was acquitted. The type of measure, the legal ground of the application, whether the decision has become final, the loss and the procedure to be followed must each be determined separately.
The general period under CMK 142 is three months from service of the decision or judgment becoming final on the person concerned, and in any event one year from its finality. For claims under CMK 141/1-e, f and l, the route is the Compensation Commission; for other grounds, the structure of the heavy criminal court with jurisdiction under the law should be considered. In claims where different legal grounds are raised together, the provisions on separation and referral in the law are also important.1
The transitional provisions of the 2024 amendments should not be overlooked. Provisional Article 6(3) of the CMK provides that the amendments to Article 141 apply to decisions or judgments that became final after 1 June 2024. Provisional Article 6(4) relates the change of jurisdiction in Article 142 to claims made on or after 1 June 2024. The date of finality and the date of the application should not be assumed to perform the same function.
In an individual application, the type of measure and the time limit are decisive
An individual application to the Constitutional Court is linked to the exhaustion of effective ordinary remedies and to the relevant admissibility conditions. The general time limit for an application is thirty days from the date on which the remedies were exhausted or, where no remedy exists, from the date on which the violation was learned of. In any event, waiting for the criminal case to become final is not the correct approach.8
The E. E. decision illustrates the risk that a complaint about house arrest before conviction is not raised in time. The continuation of a measure does not mean that every complaint about a past period may be raised indefinitely. The Veysel Kuşçu decision examined the right to liberty and security through detention based on the breach of an expired travel ban. It should not be concluded that every travel ban falls within the same scope of rights.
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the general time limit for an application to the European Court of Human Rights is four months from the final domestic decision, after effective domestic remedies have been exhausted. However, the scope of the right under the Convention, the effectiveness of the remedies and the start of the time limit are examined in each concrete case.9 Keeping the records of notifications and of learning of decisions in order from the beginning is also important for these remedies.
Conclusion
The maximum period of judicial control cannot be reduced to a mere calendar calculation of three, six or seven years. The offence group to which the measure belongs, the reduction for children, the end of the ordinary period, the reasoned extension, the four-month review and whether the measure is still necessary must be considered together.
The Veysel Kuşçu decision clearly illustrates the legal problem of an approach that excludes time spent on appeal from the calculation in a travel ban, and of detention based on breach of an expired measure. In house arrest, the distinction between the statutory maximum period and the period examined in constitutional review must be handled with care.
The foundation of a correct application is a chronology prepared from the initial decision onwards and a reasoned request stating the legal outcome sought. For the connection with the wider defence process, the criminal law practice areas may be consulted. This article provides general legal information; it does not replace an examination of the dates and decisions of the specific file. For a closely related topic, the article the first hearing in a criminal case may also be considered.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does judicial control last a maximum of three years?
Not in every file. For adults, in cases that are not heavy criminal cases, the overall limit with extension is three years; in the general heavy criminal group it is six years; and in the specific offence group under CMK 110/A/2 the limit is seven years. For children, the periods are halved. An extension does not occur automatically.
Is there a separate maximum period for the obligation to sign?
CMK 110/A does not set a separate overall period for the obligation to sign. The limit for judicial control applies according to the nature of the case. The number of times a signature is required each week, or its application together with another obligation, does not create a new full period.
Does the period of a travel ban run during appeal and cassation?
Yes. In the AYM decision in the Veysel Kuşçu case, the period during which the travel ban continued on appeal after the judgment was included in the maximum period. The first-instance conviction does not reset the calculation.
Is judicial control time before 1 January 2022 counted?
In the Veysel Kuşçu decision, the earlier period of a measure that began before the entry into force of the maximum period provision was included in the calculation. 1 January 2022 cannot be taken as a new starting point for all continuing measures.
If the four-month review is not carried out, does the measure end automatically?
Failure to comply with the four-month review obligation is different from the total maximum period expiring. An application may be made in respect of the delay; however, it cannot be said that every delay has the automatic result of removal. The continuation of the measure and the effect of the delay must be examined in the concrete case.
How many days is the current objection period for judicial control?
For decisions given on or after 1 June 2024, the general period is two weeks from the date the decision is learned of. The five-day provision on requests for removal is not an objection period. Older sources referring to seven days should not be used for current decisions.
Does an obligation to sign or a house arrest obligation stop when I object?
An objection does not automatically suspend the implementation of the decision. Under CMK 269, deferral of execution may be considered separately. The petition should not be considered to provide exemption on its own unless and until the decision is changed or removed.
Does judicial control end when a conviction is pronounced?
The first-instance conviction and its finality are different matters. While the appeal continues, judicial control may also continue within its statutory limits. The decision of the 4th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation examined concerns the continuation of a travel ban in a file where the judgment had become final and the matter had moved to the enforcement stage.
Does every day of house arrest count against a sentence?
Under CMK 109/6, every two days spent under the obligation not to leave one's home count as one day for deduction. In the maximum judicial control period, however, the days passed are not halved. Deduction and the calculation of the maximum period are different.
Does breach of an expired travel ban justify detention?
According to the Veysel Kuşçu decision, breach of a measure that no longer has a legal basis cannot serve as a ground for detention under CMK 112. This result does not mean that no detention can be ordered in a different file or on an independent legal ground.
Can everyone who is acquitted receive compensation for judicial control?
No. The type of measure and the ground of compensation claimed are important. CMK 141/1-l is a specific provision on the obligation not to leave one's home and the treatment obligation provided for in the law. Every signing obligation or travel ban is not within the same sub-paragraph.
If there is judicial control in another file as well, is a single removal decision sufficient?
Each independent decision must be examined within its own file. The expiry of a period or removal of the measure in one file does not automatically remove the decision in another file. In particular, in the case of a travel ban, all active orders and notifications must be checked.
Sources and legal bases
- Code of Criminal Procedure No. 5271 (Ceza Muhakemesi Kanunu), consolidated text published by the Ministry of Justice, in particular Arts. 2, 100, 103, 109–112, 141–142, 268–269 and Provisional Art. 6. Maximum period provision: Art. 17 of Law No. 7331 and its entry-into-force provision; 2024 changes to the remedies: Law No. 7499. Official text.
- Constitutional Court, Plenary, Veysel Kuşçu, Application No. 2023/95649, 16.12.2025. Official Gazette: 16.04.2026, issue 33226. In particular §§ 37–43 and the dissenting opinion. Decision text.
- Constitutional Court, Second Section, E. E., Application No. 2022/94010, 30.04.2025. In particular §§ 14–26. Decision text.
- 4th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation (Yargıtay 4. Ceza Dairesi), E. 2024/9285, K. 2025/2304, 10.02.2025. Finality and enforcement stage: travel ban. Decision text.
- Ersan Şen and Erkan Duymaz, "Determination of the Maximum Period in Judicial Control and Comparative Assessment with Pretrial Detention in Terms of Appeal Remedies" (Adli Kontrol Tedbirinde Azami Sürenin Belirlenmesi ve Kanun Yolları Bakımından Tutukluluk Tedbiri ile Karşılaştırmalı Değerlendirme), 18.04.2026. Doctrinal assessment on calculating the appeal period. Academic article.
- Berna Ayşen Yılmaz, "Obligation Not to Leave One's Home as a Judicial Control Measure: House Arrest" (Adli Kontrol Tedbiri Kapsamında Konutunu Terk Etmeme Yükümlülüğü: Ev Hapsi), Ankara Barosu Dergisi (Ankara Bar Journal), 80(2), 2022, pp. 101–187; pp. 163–165 for this article. DOI: 10.30915/abd.1141942. Academic article.
- Önder Yaman, "Maximum Judicial Control Periods" (Azami Adli Kontrol Süreleri), Hukuki Haber, 13.10.2026. Source article on which the topic was determined; the assessment has been extended with current legislation and decisions. Article.
- Constitutional Court, Individual Application, Time Limit (Bireysel Başvuru — Süre Aşımı); Law No. 6216 (6216 sayılı Kanun), Art. 47. Admissibility criteria.
- European Court of Human Rights, application information. Four-month application period and admissibility framework. Application information.