Judicial control applied in an investigation opened because of an expressed opinion may interfere with freedom of expression, even where no final conviction exists. However, the existence of an interference does not in itself amount to a violation. The legal basis of the measure, its concrete purpose, its duration, the burden it places on the person and the available objection routes are assessed together. The Constitutional Court's decision in Hülya Kar shows the limits of this review and the matters the applicant must set out.
This article examines in particular the obligation to sign in and requests to lift judicial control, which are linked to freedom of expression. Other measures such as pretrial detention, the obligation not to leave one's residence and seizure have their own additional safeguards. A decision on one measure cannot be carried over to another merely because the two share a name. Remedies against pretrial detention are discussed in the article on objection to pretrial detention and requests for release, and the obligation not to leave one's residence is discussed in the article on house arrest and judicial control.
At what stage does an interference with freedom of expression arise
A right may be restricted before any conviction
Protective measures are temporary restrictions that serve the conduct of an investigation or prosecution. Their purpose is not to punish a person in advance. They may be used under statutory conditions to uncover the material truth or to make it possible to enforce a future judgment. Because guilt has not been established during the measure, it does not remove the presumption of innocence.
Where a link is established between an expression of opinion and the measure, Article 26 of the Constitution comes into play. For example, a regular signing obligation imposed on a person investigated for remarks made at a meeting is not seen merely as an obligation to attend a police station. The relationship of that obligation to the expression of opinion is also assessed. Conversely, no judicial control order is automatically a violation of freedom of expression merely because the person is a journalist, a politician or a speaker. The scope and limits of Article 26 of the Constitution are outlined in the article on freedom of expression: scope, limits and routes to legal remedy.
The type of measure determines the safeguards that apply
A weekly signing obligation and pretrial detention are not interferences of the same intensity. Arrest and pretrial detention are subject to the special safeguards of Article 19 of the Constitution, which apply separately. A ban on leaving the country, the obligation not to leave one's residence or the seizure of communication devices may require assessment together with other rights. The Hülya Kar decision that this article relies on concerns the obligation to sign in once a week; it contains no direct provision on the lawfulness of pretrial detention or house arrest.
When an application is prepared, the name of the measure, the date of the decision, the real scope of the obligation and the way it is applied must be stated clearly. Where there is more than one obligation, each one must be shown, together with the effect they have in combination. Stating only that the person is under judicial control does not explain the seriousness of the interference.
The facts and ruling in the Hülya Kar decision
In the case, a weekly signing obligation was imposed
Hülya Kar was placed under judicial control in an investigation for propaganda for a terrorist organization, based on slogans allegedly shouted at a protest meeting. The criminal judgeship of peace (sulh ceza hâkimliği) ordered her to sign in at the nearest law enforcement unit every Monday; the objection was rejected. The applicant applied to the Constitutional Court twenty-seven days after the measure order and did not provide information about later developments. The use of meeting and expression activities as evidence in an offence of membership of an organization is examined separately in the article on how expression and meeting activities are assessed in organization membership offences.
The Constitutional Court accepted that the measure applied in the context of an investigation into expression of an opinion constituted an interference with freedom of expression. It nevertheless assessed together the applicant's hearing, the opportunity to object, the evidence in the file, the duration of the measure at that stage and the weight of the weekly signing obligation. The Court concluded that, in the concrete circumstances, no unusual or excessive burden had been demonstrated. For the facts and reasoning, see Hülya Kar [Plenary Assembly], Application No. 2015/20360, February 27, 2019, paras. 7–11 and 47–55.
The ruling is one of inadmissibility
Summary of the Constitutional Court's ruling: The complaint of a violation of freedom of expression was unanimously declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. This is not the same procedural category as a merits decision finding no violation in the operative part. That the reasoning discusses whether the interference was justified does not change the type of ruling.
Legal characterization: The decision is a constitutional review of a protective measure that interfered with freedom of expression. It is not a criminal court decision that conclusively establishes the elements of the offence of propaganda. The Constitutional Court did not stand in for the pending criminal proceedings and did not determine whether the applicant is guilty.
How temporariness, proportionality and reasoning are examined
As the measure continues, the currency of its reasoning becomes important
The Constitutional Court states directly:
“The temporary nature of the measure means that it ends once the purpose expected from it has been achieved.”
Source of the quotation: Hülya Kar [Plenary Assembly], Application No. 2015/20360, February 27, 2019, § 26. The sentence in quotation marks is reproduced from the text of the decision.
An obligation that seemed reasonable at the outset may produce different results over time. Hearing the witnesses, gathering the evidence, the person's compliance with every summons or a change in their health are new facts that must be considered when deciding whether the measure should continue. The elapsed time is not merely a matter of the calendar; its cumulative effect on the person's profession, family and expression is significant.
The time limits in Article 110/A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) and the proportionality assessment in a concrete case are separate matters. That a statutory upper limit has not yet been reached does not by itself justify every continuation order. The application must identify the time regime applicable to the offence and the type of proceedings, and must not rely on a general reference to a period. For details of how the periods are calculated, see the article on maximum judicial control periods.
How a lighter obligation would serve the purpose must be explained
Alongside a request to lift the measure entirely, alternatives may be considered, such as reducing the frequency of signing to the extent the case requires, changing the place of signing, or a temporary exemption from one obligation. Acceptance of these options is not automatic. The proposed change must show how the person's participation in the proceedings and the legitimate aim of the measure would still be protected.
For example, stating only that a person who travels regularly for work is employed provides limited explanation. When the work schedule, the travel route, the place of signing, the travel time and an alternative reporting arrangement are presented together, the burden becomes measurable. The same method can be used where education or health needs are involved.
The State's reasoning and the person's objection must be argued on the same facts
Public authorities may rely on reasons specific to the file, such as the person's failure to attend summonses or the risk of influencing evidence. The defence should address these reasons on their merits, examining whether they are current and what concrete basis supports them. The decision-making authority, for its part, should not be content to repeat the name of the offence; it must examine the facts both for and against the person.
In the Hülya Kar decision, the Constitutional Court recognized a margin of discretion for the first-instance authorities as regards the purpose of the measures and the conditions of their application. That margin is not unlimited. Practices that are unlawful, arbitrary or that cause a consequence more severe than is unavoidable for the right are subject to constitutional review. The substantive dispute in the file and the independent harm caused by the measure must be set out separately.
Competent authority, time limits and file preparation
An objection and a request for lifting are separate procedures
Article 111 of the CMK regulates objections to decisions on judicial control, and a request to lift or amend the obligation may be made under the relevant provisions. The current general objection period, where the law contains no special provision, is two weeks from the day the decision is learned of. The former seven-day period in Article 268 of the CMK should not be used as the current rule for decisions issued on or after June 1, 2024. The transitional regime for earlier decisions is examined separately.
The objection petition is submitted to the authority that issued the decision. For judicial control decisions of a criminal judgeship of peace, the reviewing authority is the judge of the relevant criminal court of first instance under Article 268(3)(b) of the CMK; special questions of competence and jurisdictional area are checked on the file. For decisions of the trial court during the prosecution stage, the authority cannot be assumed in the same way.
Missing the period to object to the first decision and seeking to lift the measure on the basis of circumstances that arose later are different matters. A new request does not automatically renew any period that was missed in the past. Likewise, the duty to apply does not end the obligation by itself; the order in force should not be stopped until a change to it has been confirmed.
| Step | Competent authority and time limit | Core record needed in the file |
|---|---|---|
| Objection to a judicial control order | Filed with the authority that issued the order; generally two weeks from learning of it | The order, record of learning or service, grounds of objection |
| Request for lifting or amendment | The judicial authority competent for the investigation or trial stage | New facts, evidence of compliance with the obligation, documents showing the concrete burden |
| Individual application to the Constitutional Court | Generally thirty days from learning of the final decision, after effective ordinary remedies have been exhausted | All decisions, application documents, dates and a concrete explanation of the rights violation |
In an individual application, the criminal case and the complaint about the measure must be kept apart
An application to the Constitutional Court is not a new stage for evaluating evidence that continues the ordinary remedies. A measure application made while a criminal case is ongoing is not always rejected; however, the outcome of the main trial cannot be fixed in advance under the name of a measure. Whether effective remedies are available, whether the measure continues and whether compensation is possible are assessed separately according to the nature of the complaint. For how an individual application is brought while criminal proceedings are pending, see the article on individual application to the Constitutional Court in a criminal case.
Author's assessment: The core of an effective application should not be only that the lawfulness of the expressed opinion is in question. Why the measure is not necessary, after which stage it has lost its purpose and how much burden it places on the person should be explained with documents. The practical importance of the Hülya Kar decision lies in separating these two arguments.
Conclusion
Judicial control linked to the expression of an opinion is open to constitutional review. However, the existence of an interference is not the same as the existence of a violation. The scope of the measure, its duration, its current reasoning, less intrusive alternatives and personal effects must be made concrete. The inadmissibility outcome in Hülya Kar cannot be read as a general approval of all judicial control practices. For review of disciplinary penalties imposed for protest in prison, see the article on protest and hunger strikes in prison; for a restriction on an entire platform, see the article on access bans on social media platforms.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a weekly signing obligation count as an interference with freedom of expression
Where it is connected to an investigation based on an expression of opinion, it may. Whether it amounts to a violation of rights is determined by examining the purpose of the measure and its concrete effects.
Did the Constitutional Court find a violation in the Hülya Kar decision
No. The complaint of freedom of expression was unanimously declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.
Does the signing obligation end when an objection petition is filed
It does not end automatically. A competent authority must order the lifting, amendment or another relevant change.
Is the objection period to a judicial control order seven days
For decisions issued on or after June 1, 2024, the general period under Article 268 of the CMK is two weeks. The starting date and any special provision must also be checked.
Is it always necessary for the criminal case to end before applying to the Constitutional Court
The same answer cannot be given in every case. A complaint about the measure itself and an allegation concerning the main trial are separated; effective routes of application are determined according to the specific measure.
Sources and legal bases
- Constitutional Court (AYM), Hülya Kar [Plenary Assembly], Application No. 2015/20360, February 27, 2019, in particular paras. 17–35, 44–55 and the operative part. Official decision record · Full-text access.
- Constitutional Court (AYM), Summaries of Decisions on Fundamental Rights (Nitelikli Haklar Karar Özetleri), June 2025, printed pp. 15–16. The full decision text was reviewed alongside the summary.
- Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası), Arts. 13, 19, 26, 38 and 148; Law No. 6216 (6216 sayılı Kanun), Arts. 45, 47, 48 and 50.
- Law No. 5271 (Code of Criminal Procedure, CMK), Arts. 100, 109–112 and 267–271; text of Art. 268 and text of Art. 111. Amending Law No. 7499, Arts. 22 (CMK provisional Art. 6), 37 and 40. Accessible publication of the amending text.